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NOTE FROM THE AUTHOR:
This article is part of a "twin series." The analysis that follows
constitutes the second case study as part of a comprehensive ex-
amination of two representative major international business trans-
actions in the capital-intensive petroleum and energy sector. The
first case study, entitled Partnerships with Monarchs in the Search for
Oil: Unveiling and Re-Examining the Patterns of "Third World"
Economic Development in the Petroleum Sector, was published in the
previous issue of this Journal. The first part of the "twin series"
("First Article" or "Case One") explores and critiques the current
patterns of "Third World" economic development in the explora-
tion for, development, and production of petroleum resources.
The instant Article ("Case Two") focuses specifically on the devel-
opment of energy resources once petroleum has been extracted.
Case Two dissects an Independent Power Project ("IPP") and then
re-evaluates the role played by Multilateral and Project Financing
in such a project. The instant Article, or Case Two, should be read
as a continuation of the First Article, Case One.
Although each case study is presented under separate title and
published independently in two consecutive issues of this Journal,
both titles should be considered part of one comprehensive study
and analysis, with the instant Article serving as a continuation of
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the First Article (with continuing footnotes and the same usage of,
and stylistic format for, defined terms). Both cases together repre-
sent the full cycle of petroleum resources development- they de-
scribe what happens when gas is found offshore and then trans-
ported onshore to be used as fuel supply for the generation of
electricity in a "Third World" country. Only when readers exam-
ine both cases consecutively will the author's objective be fully
achieved-to offer the academic and legal community a compre-
hensive and critical examination of the patterns of economic devel-
opment in a "Third World" environment. Both cases use the So-
cialist Republic of Vietnam as the representative deal and factual
context. The final conclusions offered by the author are based on
both case studies.
3.2. Case Two: The "Mid-Stream" Transaction
Suppose that in the Vietnam Deal, the International Oil and
Gas Company ("IOGC") had discovered Natural Gas (rather than
Crude Oil) in the Contract Area.294 The IOGC would then have to
evaluate the discovery and renegotiate the Production Sharing
Contract ("PSC") for more specific gas terms, because typically a
PSC leaves the contractual terms governing natural gas for future
negotiation. 295 This is as much a necessity as a norm, since gas
terms cannot be projected or particularized ahead of time without
a technical evaluation of the type of gas discovered and the avail-
ability of a long-term gas sale market in the region. (Crude oil can
294 In a typical petroleum agreement, "Crude Oil" may be defined as "solid
and liquid hydrocarbons in their natural state and also includes any liquid hydro-
carbons extracted from Natural Gas except for methane." See, e.g., China National
Oil Development Corporation, Model Contract for Subject Area of the People's
Republic of China (Nov. 1995), in James Barnes, Granting Instruments Issues
(Supp. Pt. 7). "Natural Gas" may be defined as both "'Associated' and 'Non-
Associated' natural gas under natural conditions. It can be wet if it contains con-
densates, or dry if it does not contain them." See, e.g., License Agreement for the
Exploration and Exploitation of Hydrocarbons Entered into by and between Pe-
ruPetro SA and Great Western Ltd. Sucursal Del Peru Area (No. 68), in James Bar-
nes, Granting Instruments Issues (Supp. Pt. 7); see also Model Contract, Oil and
Gas Concession Agreement for Exploration and Production (Budapest, Dec. 1994)
("Gas [means] natural gas consisting of gaseous hydrocarbons and all non-
hydrocarbons gaseous substances produced in the concession area regardless of
whether such gaseous substances exist in liquid or gaseous form in the reservoir
or in solution with crude oil, but excluding liquid condensate which by normal
field method is separated from natural gas.").
295 See Wendy N. Duong, Partnerships with Monarchs - Two Case Studies, 25 U.
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be shipped all over the world. On the other hand, natural gas
transportation by ship is only economically feasible if the natural
gas is liquefied -the cooling and compression needed to "shrink"
the gas from its original volume.)296
Gas discoveries are often non-commercial unless they are very
large in quantity, are quite rich in liquids (this description refers to
the density or percentage of liquid in the gas), and there exists a
market for gas sale or use.297 Quite often, gas development in the
developing nations is a large-scaled and long-term proposition, in-
volving complex planning and technical gas processing.
Accordingly, many gas fields discovered in the "Third World"
are still "waiting on pipe," sitting idle for years awaiting develop-
ment, due primarily to two reasons. First, many exploration acre-
ages are located a long distance from the kind of gas markets that
would make gas sales profitable. Second, if the gas is rich enough,
liquid extraction is a development option, but liquefaction facilities
are extremely expensive and take a long time to build (as long as
two years or more). For example, the Arun liquefaction complex
built by Mobil Oil Indonesia (now ExxonMobil) cost approximately
$3 billion.298
However, if gas is discovered in sufficient quality and quantity,
and if adequate infrastructure for the transport of gas exists or can
readily be contemplated, the gas discovered can become the fuel
supply for power-generation plants, built to meet electricity needs
of the host country, nearby nations, and the region as a whole. In
the energy chain, the conversion of natural gas discovered at the
wellhead into electricity can be classified as the "midstream" pro-
gression of an "upstream" exploration project such as the Vietnam
Deal.299 Accordingly, as a continuation of the Vietnam Deal, this
296 A. Kaplan & Graham Marshall, World LNG Trade Responding to Increased
Natural Gas Demand, OIL & GAS J., Nov. 24, 2003, at 74.
297 The construction and operation of a Liquefied Natural Gas ("LNG") lique-
faction plant involves significant capital costs, thereby requiring very large depos-
its of easily extractable natural gas to supply feedstock to the plant, and most of
the projected output must be committed in long-term sales contracts before a pro-
ject can receive third-party financing. Today's new LNG facility will require certi-
fied natural gas reserves of more than 4 tcf in order to be considered for Non-
Recourse Financing supported by long-term gas sales contracts. Id. Although the
technology was developed in the U.K., the business of gas liquefaction really took
off in Asia. Japan, which had no gas production of its own, adopted the technol-
ogy and was quickly followed by South Korea and Taiwan. Steve Robertson, LNG
Spending Will Reach $39 billion by 2007, OnL & GAs J., Jan. 12, 2004, at 62.
298 Michael Shari, Over a Barrel in Indonesia, Bus. WK., Dec. 27, 1999, at 8.
299 See Duong, supra note 295, at 1193; Press Release, World Bank, Vietnam
2005]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
Article will next dissect a typical IPP in which gas discovered up-
stream is used as fuel to generate electricity as a commodity for
sale (the "IPP or Midstream Transaction"). 300 The IPP Transaction
is selected because it is typically funded by Project Financing, a le-
gal and business concept crucial to "Third- World" economic de-
velopment.
3.2.1. Anatomy of an IPP Transaction
The IPP Transaction is an integrated, multi-deal energy transac-
tion consisting of several related agreements, concurrently negoti-
ated and coordinated. At the heart of the transaction is the Power
Developer (at times called the Power Supplier, or Independent Power
Producer), which is the entity responsible for developing the Power-
Generation Facility ("Facility") and supplying electricity to buyers.
The agreements constituting the IPP Transaction consist of the fol-
lowing: (i) an agreement between the Power Developer and an ex-
pert contractor for the "Engineering, Procurement, and Construction"
(the "EPC Function") of the Facility (the "EPC Contract"); (ii) an
agreement between the Power Developer and an expert operator
for the "Operation and Maintenance" (the "O&M Function") of the
Facility (the "O&M Contract"); (iii) an agreement between a gas
supplier and the Power Developer, who agrees to buy gas from the
gas supplier as fuel for the Facility (the "Gas Sales Agreement" or
"Fuel Supply Agreement");301 (iv) a long-term electricity sale-
Project to Help Meet Power Shortfall; MIGA and ADB Support Phu My 3 Power
Project (June 12, 2004) [hereinafter Vietnam Project to Help Meet Power Shortfall],
available at http://www.worldbank.org.vn/news/press24_01.htm (last visited
Jan. 26, 2005); Associated Press, Pipeline from Vietnam's Offshore Gas Fields Reaches
Land, ALEXANDER'S GAS & OIL CONNECTIONS (June 17, 2002) [hereinafter Pipeline
from Vietnam's Offshore Gas Fields Reaches Land] (showing integration of offshore
gas field, pipeline construction, and power-generation plant onshore in the South
China Sea project), available at http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/
news/nts22852.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
300 The terms "Midstream Transaction" and "Independent Power Project
("IPP") Transaction" are used herein synonymously.
301 Various transportation arrangements may be necessary to enable the de-
livery of gas fuel to the plants. These transportation agreements will also be part
of the Project Documents submitted for bankers' review. Accordingly, an IPP
transaction may occasion infrastructure building projects, such as pipeline con-
struction and operation. For example, British Petroleum was instrumental in the
development of an approximately $1.3 billion pipeline project purported to trans-
port gas from the South China Sea to various onshore fuel power stations in Viet-
nam. Pipeline from Vietnam's Offshore Gas Fields Reaches Land, supra note 299;
Agence France Presse, BP's Vietnam Gas Project Completed After a Decade, THE
VIETNAM NEws (Nov. 25, 2002), available at http://perso.wanadoo.fr/patrick.
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purchase arrangement (called "Power Purchase Agreement" or
"PPA") executed by the Power Developer and buyers of electricity.
The PPA (or a cluster of PPAs) constitutes the core economics of
the IPP Transaction because the PPA provides the income stream
used to pay off the costs of Facility construction and operation, as
well as the costs of gas fuel.30 2 The income stream can last for dec-
ades, and will be used to pay off loan proceeds over the years. Ac-
cording to a joint study by the World Bank and USAID, PPA terms
in Asia and Latin America may range from fourteen to forty
years; 303 and (v) an optional "Implementation Agreement" executed
by the Power Developer with the host government. The Imple-
mentation Agreement sets the regulatory framework and stan-
dards for the project, based on, or in addition to, the applicable lo-
cal law. The Implementation Agreement may act as the broader
regulatory overlay, infusing its effect into all other agreements
that, together, document the IPP Transaction.
All of the agreements described above constitute "Project
Documents," 3 4 which must be reviewed not only by the parties, but
also by financing institutions contemplating commitments to fi-
nance the project. Parties to these Project Documents constitute
principal "Project Participants" in the IPP Transaction, each provid-
ing a critical function as described below. First, the Power Devel-
oper undertakes to develop and own the Facility. The Power De-
veloper can be a single company, a consortium, or a joint venture,
either incorporated or unincorporated. When the joint venture is
incorporated under the law of the host country, the result is a Pro-
guenin/cantho/vnnews/bpvn.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2005); see also Minh Ngoc,
BP Reaching for Target, VIETNAM INVESTMENT REV. (Jan. 5, 2004) (discussing Gas
Supply Agreement executed by PetroVietnam as buyer of gas from BP's gas field
to supply fuel to power-generation plant), available at http://www.vir.com.vn/
Client/VIR/index.asp?url=content.asp&doc=2156 (last visited Feb. 22, 2005); ac-
cord AsiaPulse via COMTEX, Nam Con Son Production Set to Skyrocket Late This
Year, ALEXANDER'S GAS & OIL PRODUCTION (June 25, 2003), available at
http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/company/.cns32860.htm (last visited Feb. 3,
2005).
302 Laura Onofri, Contracts, Investment Incentives and Efficiency in the Restruc-
tured Electricity Market, 16 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 23, 24, 34 (2003).
303 See, e.g., id. at 23-28. A Power Purchase Agreement may cover a period of
fifteen to thirty years. Id. at 24; see also DAVID BAUGHMAN & MATTHEW BURESCH,
MOBILIZING PRIVATE CAPITAL FOR THE POWER SECTOR: EXPERIENCE IN ASIA AND LATIN
AMERICA (U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev. & World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 16276,
1994) (discussing PPA terms examined for studies ranging from fourteen years to
forty years, with the average being twenty to twenty-five years).
304 This configuration of transactions does not include various financing
agreements to secure funding for the project.
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ject Entity bearing the juridical status of the host country. All Pro-
ject Participants who contribute capital and hold equity interests in
the project are functionally shareholders of the Project Entity. Sec-
ond, the EPC Contractor undertakes the EPC Function and executes
the EPC Contract with the Power Developer for the construction of
the Facility. Third, the O&M Contractor or Plant Operator is
responsible for the O&M Function and executes the O&M Contract
with the Power Developer for the maintenance and operation of
the Facility. Fourth, the Fuel Supplier is responsible for the supply,
transportation, and delivery of fuel to the Facility. (Where gas
from the upstream discovery becomes the source of fuel for a gas-
fired facility as in the Vietnam Deal, fuel supply is provided by the
IOGC that has discovered gas upstream. The IOGC may decide to
act as the Power Developer, thereby wearing a "double hat.")
Fifth, the Power Purchaser executes the PPA with the Power
Developer, and hence provides the income stream for the project.
The Power Purchaser can be governments, municipal authorities,
or public utility companies in the region. Sixth, the host
government or its designated state-owned entity can be a Power
Purchaser, or the government can simply act as the overseeing
regulatory authority that controls the utility sector or the project.
The host government may also execute an optional
Implementation Agreement with the Power Developer.
3.2.2. IPP Transactions, Project Financing, and "Off-Balance-
Sheet Accounting"
Because of its self-sufficient nature, the IPP Transaction is the
classic international business transaction typically funded by Pro-
ject Financing. The structure of an IPP Transaction can best be ex-
plained in connection with Project Financing as a legal and busi-
ness concept.
For several decades, Project Financing (sometimes called "Seg-
regated Financing") has enabled billions of dollars of funding for
economic development projects in the "Third World." The term,
therefore, also refers to a specialty banking practice within the
practice of law, focusing exclusively on this type of financing
transaction. Simply stated, Project Financing is a financing method
based solely on the merits of the project, rather than on the credit-
worthiness of the project sponsor. In the classic, purest form of
Project Financing, all parties to the integrated deal (including
bankers or financiers) look to (i) future revenues generated by the
[Vol. 26:1
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project as the source of funds from which project loans will be
paid; and (ii) the assets of the projects, whether physical or as con-
tractual rights, as security or collateral for the loans. In traditional
corporate financing, lenders typically have recourse to all of the
project sponsor's assets and revenues. The structure of a Project-
Financed transaction limits the lender's security to the assets and
cash flow of the project itself, typically under the rubric of a project
company formed specifically to construct, own, and operate the
Project Facility.3 5 The loan is either with limited recourse or com-
pletely no recourse to the project sponsor, resulting in either limited
or no encumbrance on the sponsor's balance sheet. Hence, the
sponsor can maintain its general creditworthiness despite the high
debt-equity leverage ratio that may have been incurred by virtue of
the debtor's sponsorship of international Project-Financed transac-
tions. The sponsor may contribute about twenty to forty percent of
the investment as equity, with the remainder infused strictly as
project debts.306 (For its equity contribution, the sponsor may use
its earnings, raise money on the international or domestic capital
markets by offering debt securities or equity securities, or other-
wise obtain funding or loans via commercial sources and/or via
the Multilateral Institutions. The sponsor can also spread risks by
sharing equity contribution with other companies.) Overall, Pro-
ject Financing enables the sponsor to limit its risk exposure to its
own equity investment in the project.
From the lender's perspective, under Project Finance principles,
when it is contractually established that the project can pay for it-
self over an extended period of time, bankers may be persuaded to
make loans based on demonstration of the project's long-term self-
sustaining capabilities and economic viability. Such demonstration
of viability and assurances of an uninterrupted income stream are
evidenced in the contractual arrangements among the Project Par-
ticipants. Accordingly, in order to determine whether Project Fi-
nancing is appropriate, commercial lenders will closely scrutinize
Project Documents for any risks of disruption to the income stream
or impairment of project assets. Lenders will examine the contrac-
tual language of all Project Documents to decipher whether these
risks of loss have been adequately treated via transfer to the third
305 David Blumental, Sources of Funds and Risk Management for International
Energy Projects, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 267, 270 (1998).
306 Id; accord PETER K. NEVITr & FRANK FABOZZI, PROJECT FINANCING (6th ed.
1997) (discussing methods developed for Project Financing eligibility and offering
examples of successful undertakings).
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party, or assumed by an economically able Project Participant. If
the lender or financier sees any untreated or uncovered risk of loss,
it will either turn down the request for Project Financing, or ask for
additional guarantees or other credit enhancement tools. These
tools may alter the nature of financing from the classic form of Pro-
ject Financing to a more hybrid form bearing more resemblance to
other traditional methods of financing.30 7 The lawyering and busi-
ness skills lie in the prospective prediction and mitigation of risks
via tightly negotiated contractual language, as well as in the finan-
cial structuring and legal engineering that give lenders the neces-
sary comfort in not seeking recourse beyond the project itself. The
documentation for an international Project-Financed investment is
among the most complex and voluminous of any financing trans-
actions, and will encompass all kinds of debt and equity arrange-
ments, credit support facilities, as well as credit enhancement tools
to give lenders the assurances needed.308
The purest, classic form of IPP Project Financing is also de-
scribed as "Non-Recourse Financing." Loan proceeds will be paid
solely from the future income stream or cash flow generated by the
project "without recourse" to the assets, or as individual obligations
of the Power Developer or other Project Participants. In such pure
Non-Recourse Financing method, the existing assets of a corporate
sponsor are unencumbered by the debts. In contrast, in hybrid
(rather than classic) Project Financing, lenders may still have "lim-
ited recourse" directly or indirectly to the assets of the corporate
sponsor or equivalent. For example, the sponsor's parent company
may have issued a corporate guarantee to secure the sponsor's per-
formance or to guard against financial losses suffered by others re-
sulting from the sponsor's non-performance. Such guarantee may
provide lenders recourse to the parent company's corporate assets
in case of loan defaults. As another example, bankers may require
the sponsor to obtain a surety bond, or a Standby Letter of Credit
issued by the sponsor's bank to guard against the sponsor's de-
fault.309 (In the case of a Standby Letter of Credit, the issuing bank
307 See generally, Scott L. Hoffman, A Practical Guide to Transactional Project Fi-
nance: Basic Concepts, Risk Identification, and Contractual Considerations, 45 Bus. LAW.
181 (1989) (discussing the fundamental aspects of project finance).
308 See generally, Harold F. Moore & Evelyn D. Giaccio, International Project
Finance, 11 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 597 (1986) (defining international project
finance and presenting its legal framework as well as recent field developments in
the United States).
309 See UNCITRAL Secretariat, Explanatory Note, UNITED NATIONS
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granting the credit will make good the financial loss occasioned by
the sponsor's default, but ultimately the issuing bank will look to
the corporate accounts or assets of the sponsor -the issuing bank's
customer - via an indemnity or reimbursement agreement (exe-
cuted separately between the issuing bank and the sponsor) as a
condition precedent to the bank's issuance of the Standby Letter of
Credit.)
310
For decades, the corporate sponsor has enjoyed the single most
important benefit of pure or classic Non-Recourse Project Financ-
ing: the "off-balance sheet" accounting treatment, whereupon the li-
abilities incurred by the project are not reported on the corporate
sponsor's balance sheet because there has been no encumbrance of
corporate assets (the sponsor may still disclose the transaction un-
der the textual Management Disclosure and Analysis ("MD&A")
or footnotes to the financial statements, depending on whether the
sponsor and its auditors deem the project to be material to the fi-
CONVENTION ON INDEPENDENT GUARANTEES AND STAND-BY LETTERS OF CREDIT, 30th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/431 (1996) (stating that the Convention is designed to
facilitate the use of independent guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit), avail-
able at http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/payments/guarantees.htm (last
visited Feb. 22, 2005); Roy Goode, Abstract Payment Undertakings in International
Transactions, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L. L 1, 1-4, 16-17 (1996) (discussing international uni-
form standards in relation to abstract undertakings in general, and Standby Let-
ters of Credit specifically); Egon Guttman, Bank Guarantees and Standby Letters of
Credit: Moving Toward a Uniform Approach, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 167, 169-70 (1990)
(remarking that unknown credit standing of purchasers has led to the develop-
ment of Standby Letters of Credit); see also Harris Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio &
Television, 691 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1982) (granting an injunction against receipt of
payment on a letter of credit to Iranian defendants during the 1979-80 hostage cri-
sis); Int'l Housing, Ltd. v. Rafidain Bank Iraq, 712 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(holding payment of overdraft guarantees by a Canadian Bank into a U.S. account
sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act); Am. Bell Int'l, Inc. v. Iran, 474 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (deny-
ing injunction against payment of a letter of credit to Iran by an American bank
consequent to the 1979 Islamic Revolution); Michael Stern, Comment, The Inde-
pendence Rule in Standby Letters of Credit, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 218 (1985) (examining
the problem of defining "fraud in the transaction" (as opposed to "fraud on the
document") and applying it to cases involving Standby Letters of Credit).
For a critical analysis of Standby Letters of Credit as a risk-shifting mecha-
nism and legal device, see Henry D. Gabriel, Standby Letters of Credit: Does The Risk
Outweigh the Benefits?, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 705 (1988) (arguing that the pre-
sent level of regulation of standby letters of credit is insufficient); cf. John F. Dolan,
Analyzing Bank-Drafted Standby Letter of Credit Rules, the International Standby Prac-
tice (ISP98), 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1865 (2000) (challenging the economic efficiency of
the International Standby Practices 1998 regime and advising that purchasers of
Standby Letters of Credit insist on ISP98's selective application or abandonment).
310 Blumental, supra note 305.
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nancial picture represented).311 Corporate sponsors prefer pure or
classic Non-Recourse Project Financing, and will bend backward to
obtain or structure funding as such. The end result is evident -the
high-risk "Third World" development project in question will
leave no effect on their assets, credit, or balance sheet.
312
To a limited and highly technical extent, the post-Enron Corpo-
ration ("Enron") legislation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, has
taken away this "safety-net" from the corporate sponsor. Section
401(a) of the Act added a new Section 130) to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 by requiring public companies to disclose in
their 10K Annual Report and 10Q Quarterly Report all "material
off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements, obligations, and other
relationships of the issuer with unconsolidated entities."313 The
SEC has interpreted "off-balance sheet arrangements" to include
"Variable Interest Entities," defined by FASB Interpretation No. 46
("FIN 46"), as contractual, ownership or other pecuniary interests
in an entity that change with changes in the entity's net asset
value.314 Simply stated, "Variable Interests" are investments or in-
terests that will absorb a portion of the entity's expected losses if
they occur, or receive portions of the entity's expected residual re-
turns if they occur.315 FIN 46 describes Variable Interests Entities to
include Project-Financed investments and certain lease-back fi-
311 In its latest Interpretive Release, the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) opined that Item 303 of Regulation S-K, Management's Discussion &
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operation ("MD&A"), should en-
hance the overall financial disclosure and provide the context within "which fi-
nancial information should be analyzed.., so that investors can ascertain the like-
lihood that past performance is indicative of future performance." The MD&A
disclosure should reveal, inter alia, known material trends and uncertainties. In-
terpretation: Comnmission Guidance Regarding Management's Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Result of Operations, Release Nos. 33-8350,
34-48960, FR-72, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056 (Dec. 29, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-8350.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2005).
312 CREDIT AND RELATED DOCUMENTATION FOR PROJECT FINANCE TRANSACTIONS
(PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course, Handbook Series, 1993).
313 15 U.S.C. § 78m(j) (2002).
314 FIN. Acr. STANDARDS BD. (FASB), FASB INTERPRETATION No. 46:
CONSOLIDATION OF VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITIES para. 2(c) (2003), available at
http://www.fasb.org/fin46r.pdf; see also Laird H. Simons, III, et al., SEC Issues
Final Rule Regarding Disclosure of Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and Contractual
Obligations (reporting the implementation of Section 401A of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and discussing the scope required for disclosures as well as the situations to
which the requirements may apply), at http://articles.corporate.findlaw.com/
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nancing techniques. Therefore, currently, depending on how an
IPP Transaction is structured (for example, which entity owns
which interest, and receives income or absorbs losses in what
manner or through what legal structure), under the widely cast net
of Sarbanes-Oxley and in the SEC's view, an IPP Transaction may
have to be disclosed in corporate public filings if it qualifies as a
"Variable Interest" under FIN 46.
Hence, with Sarbanes-Oxley, management and its auditors no
longer have the discretion whether to disclose off-balance-sheet
Project-Financed transactions that arguably meet the definition of
FIN 46. It should be noted, however, that Sarbanes-Oxley was not
designed to address the structures of foreign direct investment
("FDI") transactions and their Non-Recourse or Limited-Recourse
Project-Financing methods -these methods have been utilized by
U.S.-based public companies for decades, all over the world. In-
stead, the legislation was specifically designed to deter the recur-
rence of the "Enron-type" fraudulent practice undertaken to dodge
tax and accounting scrutiny via the use of "Special Purpose Entities"
("SPEs"), such as subsidiaries or limited partnerships set up solely
for a special project. The "Enron" ills addressed by Sarbanes-
Oxley consist of the hiding of debts and assets that perform poorly,
as well as the quick execution of related-party transactions at
prices that are inherently suspicious, via the use of SPEs. For ex-
ample, a company may try to shift liabilities and assets to an SPE
owned by it in order to manipulate and evade accounting and re-
porting requirements- the SPE may borrow funds, yet the debts
are not shown in the books of the sponsoring parent. Or, the com-
pany may transfer bad investments to the SPE so that the declining
value will not have to be recognized by the sponsoring parent. Or,
the company may execute related-party transactions without re-
gard to arms-length negotiated prices.316 These situations are com-
pletely distinguishable from legitimate SPEs set up in accordance
with a host country's legal requirements for the specific purpose of
conducting a FDI overseas, which, by virtue of its Non-Recourse
Financing structure, may enjoy legitimate "off-balance sheet" ac-
counting treatment.
Overall, the new "off-balance sheet" disclosure requirement of
316 Enron's Accounting Rules: Mhat Can We Learn to Prevent Future Enrons?:
Hearing Before the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 87-96 (2002)
(testimony of Bala G. Dharan, Professor, Rice University), reprinted in ENRON:
CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 113, 117-20 (Nancy B. Rapoport &
Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).
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Sarbanes-Oxley is to promote transparent financial reporting in the
interest of the American investing public, rather than to address
corporate FDI transactions or "Third World" beneficiaries of those
transactions. At the same time, the "catch-all" safeguard of U.S.
federal securities law's anti-fraud provision in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities, Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act (the "Act") and SEC Rule 1Ob-5, 317 will continue to
safeguard the American trading public against fraudulent disclo-
sure or non-disclosure of corporate transactions in all relevant as-
pects.
3.2.3. Risk-Allocation as the Core Principle for Project Financing
and IPP Transactions, and the Dynamics of Lawyering
Even though "off-balance sheet" accounting may inherently be
suspect, it cannot be generalized that FDI Non-Recourse Project-
Financed transactions are per se indicia of any allegedly fraudulent
intent on the part of the sponsor. Instead, these transactions typi-
cally involve the sponsor's "good faith" risk assessment analysis in
the course of its business judgment. Unless Non-Recourse, Off-
Balance-Sheet Project Financing is available, the corporate investor
is reluctant to take on high-risk FDI transactions in faraway lands
or on foreign territories with political and legal concepts alien to
the U.S.-trained business executive or lawyer. To ban or invalidate
all such financing methods is not what the post-Enron legislation
purports to do, as the Act only imposes a more intricate and more
complete financing reporting requirement aimed to protect the U.S.
investing public. Without the type of financing structure that helps
buffer the corporate sponsor against investment risks, the corpo-
rate sponsor may not invest in a foreign country unless the profit
margin is extremely high, which quite often is attributed to drasti-
cally cheaper labor and raw materials - the same type of conditions
facing the colonists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
(In the colonist model, all Political Risks were eliminated because
the colonist government simply took over the territory and became
the "Third World" monarch!)
At the onset, therefore, it must be noted that international Pro-
ject Financing and risk-allocation principles go hand in hand and
should not be segregated as unrelated concepts. Although I have
317 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Act") § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(2004); SEC Rule 10b-5, Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).
[Vol. 26:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol26/iss1/2
PARTNERSHIPS WITH MONARCHS II
previously discussed project risks in upstream petroleum projects
in Case One, to provide a thorough understanding of the dynamics
of deal negotiation, a more in-depth focus on risk assessment is
necessary at this point in the context of IPP Transactions and their
enabling funding device, Project Financing.
From the owner-developer's perspective, risk-allocation in-
volves more than merely obtaining financing or purchasing insur-
ance. Risk-allocation principles seek to control and quantify poten-
tial losses for purposes of financial planning. Overall, risk
management techniques may typically include the following con-
siderations: (1) risk avoidance (for example: foregoing the pro-
ject); (2) loss prevention (for example: taking steps to reduce loss
frequency such as providing drivers' defensive driving training
and imposing drug-testing procedures to prevent automobile acci-
dents); (3) risk retention (for example: setting up reserves to pay
for future losses); (4) risk transfer (for example: spreading risks
through joint ventures, indemnification agreements, or assign-
ments of interest); and (5) simply purchasing insurance or a surety
bond (payment of premium for a third party to assume all quanti-
fiable future risks of lOSS). 318 When the costs of all these risk man-
agement steps exceed the anticipated profit, the first step-risk
avoidance -may become the conservative business decision not to
invest or engage in the project.
Under these risk management concepts, even the highly vola-
tile Political Risks inherent in "Third World" environments can sci-
entifically be managed like any other project risks. Economists,
lawyers, and business executives have long argued that even the
most "slippery" and speculative Political Risks can be quantified
and estimated for purposes of economic calculations, 319 and hence
can be treated via loss prevention plans or contractual means. For
example, the following loss prevention measures may be appropri-
ate to avoid the risk of expropriation in an international project: (1)
the investor should keep a low profile in the host country and des-
318 DANIEL JOHNSTON, INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM FISCAL SYSTEMS AND
PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACTS (1994). See also Margaret Rosso Grossman, Bio-
technology, Property Rights, and the Environment, 50 AM. J. CoMp. L. 215 (Supp. 2002)
(revealing risk management concepts in the evaluation of the benefits and draw-
backs of agricultural crops developed through biotechnology, as well as in the
U.S. regulatory scheme that oversees them); Robert Rosenstock & Margo Kaplan,
The Fifty-Third Session of the International Law Commission, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 412
(2002) (revealing risk management principles in discussing state responsibility
and the prevention of transnational harm from hazardous activities).
319 JOHNSTON, supra note 318.
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ignate government relations personnel to develop rapport with the
local authorities; (2) the investor should utilize local industries and
employ native personnel in order to build local support and alli-
ances and to develop worker loyalty in the host country; (3) the in-
vestor should avoid geographical over-concentration and should
locationally diversify its international investment portfolio; and (4)
last but not least, the investor should involve the government in
equity sharing, in order to get long-term governmental support.
Risk-allocation principles are supported primarily by two eco-
nomic theories: (1) the fundamental theory of exchange, and (2)
the general theory of competitive equilibrium. 320 Under the "ex-
change" theory, parties to an economic transaction are better off if
each produces the type of goods or services for which the party has
a comparative cost advantage, and risks should be shifted to the
party best equipped to prevent them. Under the "competitive
equilibrium" theory, optimum production is reached when the cost
to the provider equals the benefit to the receiver of products. Ac-
cordingly, a risk should be shifted until the cost of the risk equals
the benefit of shifting it elsewhere.321
A risk, in simplified business or economic frame of reference, is
a possibility of financial loss. Certain commercial or business risks
center on business relationships and may not be insurable because
those risks may involve the speculative loss of the chance to make
a profit, rather than physical and tangible losses that can be trans-
ferred to an insurance company at a premium.322 (Most insurance
contracts will exclude speculative losses from coverage.) Nonethe-
less, in an IPP Transaction, the costs of risks that are not insurable
must still be absorbed or assumed by a responsible party in order
for the project to sustain its economic health. When a risk is shifted
or allocated to a party, it means that such party agrees to bear the
costs of such risk because the party is most equipped to prevent or
control the risk. This is where risk management principles and the
practice of Project Financing coincide and overlap.
To bring home the risk-assessment philosophy underlying Pro-
ject Financing, there is a need to re-examine the overall risk-
allocation patterns of energy projects. Upstream petroleum explo-
320 JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 164 (1976); John G.
Mauel, Common Contractual Risk Allocations in International Power Projects, 1996
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 37, 38.
321 Id.
322 Michael C. Loulakis et al., Managing Construction Risks - The Owner's Per-
spective, in CONSTRUCTION BRIEFINGS (Fed. Publ'ns, No. 91-5, 1991).
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ration projects such as the Vietnam Deal are typically not funded
by Project Financing. It is not unusual for an IOGC holding a Par-
ticipating Interest in an oil and gas exploration project abroad to
rely on its own assets (rather than borrowed funds) to finance the
exploration venture,323 although the reputation and technological
power of the IOGC may attract additional investors to share capi-
tal, as illustrated by the Vietnam Deal. (In the Vietnam Deal, the
IOGC successfully brought in Russian and Japanese partners to
share risks.)324 The unavailability of Project Financing in upstream
projects is obviously due to the high and speculative appraisal
risks involved in exploration activities.325 However, once the IOGC
has discovered petroleum in commercial quantities such that pro-
jected investment return or an income stream is readily ascertain-
able, the IOGC may be able to borrow funds to take the project
through the expensive Development and Production phases. Pro-
ject Financing may be available at that time.3
26
In contrast, an IPP investment, as the midstream progression of
a commercial gas discovery, may be ideally suited for Project Fi-
nancing. In an IPP Transaction, prospective revenues from the sale
of electricity secured by long-term contracts are used to discharge
loan payment obligations. To satisfy the Project Financier, any risk
of disruption to the revenue stream must sufficiently be buffered
and covered via appropriate contractual risk transfers. Such con-
tractual risk transfers may include express indemnification, war-
ranty, or other remedy provisions, or otherwise be explicit or im-
plicit in the delineation of rights and obligations among the Project
Participants. The contractual risk-allocation mechanism is con-
tained in a complex set of legal agreements, with each Project Par-
ticipant assuming a special function and contributing a different
expertise. All Project Documents must be tightly negotiated and
drafted, such that all risks of loss will have been treated or shifted
to the entities most suited to assume the risks. Such entity will ei-
ther absorb the risk as part of its bargained-for benefit of the deal,
323 James E. Horrigan, Foreign Natural Resource Investment, in THE LAW OF
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (Ved P. Nanda ed., 1981).
324 R. THOMAS COLLINS, BLUE DRAGON-RECKONING IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
(2002).
325 See, e.g., Terrell Hallmark, Political Risk: Assessing Dangers in International
Exploration and Development, OFFSHORE MAGAZINE, May 1991, at 27 (discussing the
effect that political risks may have on developing and financing an international
project).
326 NEvrrr & FABOZZI, supra note 306, at 23-25, 30-32.
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or will charge other Project Participants a premium for assuming
such risk, ultimately raising the price of the contract in question.
Business sense dictates that no risk will be allocated or reallocated
among the Project Participants without a premium.
327
Accordingly, when risks are contractually shifted, identifying
the party who should assume the risk and affixing a premium for
the cost of risk-taking become crucial matters in IPP negotiation.
While each project carries its own basket of risks, there may be
risks common to all projects in the same industry. Risks involved
in IPP Transactions are particularly exacerbated by high capital
outlays, long construction and operation periods, and potentially
unstable gas and electricity markets.328 The importance of the en-
ergy and utility sectors further reinforces the impact IPP Transac-
tions may produce on the national and regional economy and, ul-
timately, upon "Third World" debts.
The job of the lawyer as planner, drafter, negotiator and re-
viewer of all such contractual transfers is undoubtedly essential.
Depending on the corporate culture, lawyers often team up with
business and technical personnel in the identification of project
risks, even though the task at hand may not purely be legal. In that
sense, the lawyer has a unique opportunity, not only to represent
the interest of her Project Participant client in the allocation of
risks, but also to oversee and observe the macroeconomic impact of
balancing contractual risk-allocation patterns in order to achieve a
certain level playing field and overall fairness. In fact, the risk-
allocation mechanism behind a project is what -drives the legal is-
sues, shapes the legal structure of the deal, and in turn creates legal
norms via the formation of lex conti'actus. I will illustrate the inter-
dependence between legal issues and risk-allocation by examining,
as an example, the treatment of Facility construction and operation
risks in an IPP investment.
327 Michael C. Loulakis & Owen J. Shean, Risk Transference in Design-Build
Contracting, in CONSTRUCTION BRIEFINGS (Fed. Publ'ns, 2d Series No. 96-5, 1996).
328 BAUGHMAN & BURESCH, supra note 303, at 25; John J. Beardsworth, Jr., Nego-
tiating Power Purchase Agreements: Fundamentals for Risk Allocation and Dispute Reso-
lution, in PRoJECT FINANCING FROM DOMESTIC TO INTERNATIONAL 27 (PLI Commer-
cial Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. A-707, 1995); Mauel, supra note
320; Robert T. Smith, Submission and Evaluation of Proposals for Private Power Gen-
eration Projects in Developing Countries, in PROJECT FINANCING FROM DOMESTIC TO
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3.2.4. Relationship between Risk Management and Legal Structure -
An Example of Contractual Risk-Allocation in the Construction
Phase of an IPP Investment
The IPP Transaction consists of two principal phases: (i) the
shorter-term construction of the Power-Generation Facility (the
EPC Contract),329 and (ii) the longer-term distribution and sale of
electricity to buyers and end-users. 330 All risk-allocation principles
in general construction contracting apply to the first phase of an
IPP investment.
As I already stated, risk-allocation techniques determine the le-
gal structure of the construction deal. This can be illustrated via
four distinct legal issues in construction contract negotiation:
331 (i)
type of contractor compensation: whether the EPC Contract
should be structured as fixed price or cost plus; (ii) type of contract
delivery method: whether the EPC Contract should be single-
sourced or multiple-sourced; (iii) type of remedies or damages: for
example, whether liquidated damages should be imposed upon a
party for certain types of events; and most importantly; (iv) type of
equity structure, which dictates the legal organization of the Pro-
ject Entity that serves as the Power Developer: whether the project
should be structured to include Vendor Equity or Government Par-
ticipation.
3.2.4.1. Type of Contractor Compensation
The manner of compensation-whether fixed price or cost
plus -can operate to shift the general risks of construction cost
overruns or changes in costs entirely to the construction contractor.
In a "fixed-price" contract, the risks of unexpected costs or cost
variations are assumed by the contractor, who undoubtedly will
raise the fixed price of the contract in order to absorb costs of the
risks. If, however, construction cost overruns are occasioned by
the Power Developer, the latter will be in a better position to con-
trol or absorb the risks, and a "cost-plus" type of contract will bet-
329 On the average, the construction of a power-generation plant takes ap-
proximately two years.
330 See discussion supra note 303.
331 These legal issues, and hence the risk-allocation mechanism from which
they derive, are addressed typically in the EPC Contract and the PPA. See, e.g.,
FEDERATION INTERNATIONAL DES INGENIEURS-CONSELS, GUIDE TO THE USE OF THE
FIDIC CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT FOR ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL WORKS 132 (3d
ed. 1988).
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ter serve such goal. On the other hand, a cost overrun caused by a
political force majeure is typically within the control of the host
government, which may act as a Power Purchaser in the project. In
such a case, the Power Purchase Agreement ("PPA") is the proper
place and means to allocate the risk of construction cost variations
ultimately to the host government. The PPA may also revert the
risk of such cost variations back to the Power Developer, who, in
such a case, will undoubtedly charge the host government a higher
"Monthly Capacity Payment" (the cost of consuming electricity to
a certain level of capacity)332 to compensate for the Power Devel-
oper's assumption of risks. Or, the host government may be asked
to financially guarantee the obligations of their affiliated Power
Purchasers. Such sovereign guarantee is the legal tool that serves
to allocate risks of cost overruns ultimately to the buyers of the
commodity and the host country.
333
3.2.4.2. Type of Contract Delivery Method
In construction contracting, "Contract Delivery Method" refers to
the organizational structure that governs the relationships among
Project Participants such as the architect, engineer, owner, con-
struction contractor, and service or supply subcontractors. 334 As
illustrated below, the Contract Delivery Method - a legal issue -
can become, and has been used as a risk-allocation technique.
In the "Traditional Contract Delivery Method," the owner hires,
first, an architect and/or an engineer to design the project, and, sec-
ond, a general contractor to build the design.335 Construction per-
formance risks are thus transferred to two sources: the design pro-
fessional, and the construction professional. The owner will
consequently be isolated from design issues, depending on the
specific contractual risk-allocation language negotiated with each
of the two contractors. This method of risk transfer is sometimes
called "Multi-prime Contracting" (as opposed to "Single-Source or
332 Capacity is defined as the "load," or "demand" for which a power-
generating unit or station is rated either by the user or by the manufacturer.
"Demand" means the rate at which electricity is delivered to or by a system.
STATISTICAL COMM., EDISON ELEC. INST., GLOSSARY OF ELECTRIC UTILITY TERMS
(1991).
333 Jonathan Inman, Government Guarantees for Infrastructure Projects, 68
PROJECT FIN. INT'L 36 (1995).
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Single-Point Contracting").336
The construction phase of an IPP investment typically is mod-
eled after a different Contract Delivery Method called "Design-
Build," suitable for projects in which the owner must require that
the Facility meet specific performance such as output or air quality
standards. Because the Power-Generation Facility must meet
quantitative electricity output as well as qualitative performance
requirements, it is better off being constructed via the Design-Build
method. The importance of output or standardized performance
criteria necessitates the transfer of all performance risks to one sin-
gle source, accomplished in one "turn-key" operation. More im-
portantly, because most IPP investments are "Non-Recourse Pro-
ject-Financed," the Power Developer must select a construction
contracting method that minimizes the risks to the financial and
technical integrity of the project. The Design-Built approach utiliz-
ing the technical expertise of one single source for all technical fronts
minimizes the chance of fragmented disputes and, hence, serves
the "Project Financing" purpose well.
337
Specifically, Facility construction is typically handled via the
execution and implementation of an Engineering, Procurement, and
Construction (EPC) Contract, also known as "turn-key" or "Single-
Point" contract. The owner holds only one party, the EPC Contrac-
tor (often an international engineering and construction firm) re-
sponsible for the entire Facility, its output, and "Commercial Opera-
tion."338 Only one contractor (as opposed to multiple contractors)
will handle all functions-from engineering and design to pro-
curement of supplies and parts, and, ultimately, construction of the
Facility. Upon timely completion and successful performance test-
ing, the EPC Contractor will "turn the key" over to the owner and
limit the contractor's risk exposure to the honoring of warranty ob-
ligations. This single-source method of contracting reduces man-
agement time, streamlines negotiation, lowers overall costs, en-
hances accountability, and enables faster completion in satisfaction
of specific performance and output standards.
336 See, e.g., FEDERATION INTERNATIONAL DES INGENIEURS-CONSEILS, FIDIC
CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT (INTERNATIONAL) FOR WORKS OF CIVIL ENGINEERING
CONSTRUCTION (3d ed. 1977).
337 Michael C. Loulakis, Power Generation Contracting Forms, in CONSTRUCTION
PROJECT FORM BOOK 257, 259 (Robert F. Cushman & P.J. Trimble eds., 1994).
338 The EPC Contractor may obtain the services of subcontractors, although it
remains primarily liable to the owner-developer regarding all aspects of the EPC
Contract. For a definition and discussion of "Commercial Operation," see Duong,
supra note 295, at 1237 n.150.
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3.2.4.3. Type of Remedies or Damages
From the owner-developer's perspective, the risk-allocation
pattern in the Design-Build method, however, is not diversified. If
things go wrong, the owner must rely on only one source for recov-
ery or compensation. Accordingly, the owner must be protected
by predetermined, well-calculated contractual remedies. If the
EPC Contractor fails to fulfill any of its obligations (whether it be
Facility output, Commercial Operation, or a target completion
date), the owner-developer must impose very high and precisely
calculated liquidated damages as a means of remedying risks of
loss. Pure legal issues such as the imposition of liquidated dam-
ages thus become the primary mechanism to allocate the risk of de-
lay in Facility completion or failure to achieve target performance.
Such delay or failure will interfere with the predetermined income
stream expected from scheduled electricity sales. The party who
occasions the delay or failure, or is in the best position to prevent
such delay or failure, must therefore be responsible for paying liq-
uidated damages, or otherwise making good all financial losses, in
amounts sufficient for the owner-developer to ultimately cover
loan proceeds and to continue the project without interruption.
That party may be: (i) the EPC Contractor, if the delay or failure
occurs with respect to the completion or performance of the Facil-
ity; or (ii) the O&M Contractor (the Plant Operator), if the delay or
failure occurs in connection with the ongoing operation and main-
tenance of the Facility. However, if the delay or failure of per-
formance is attributed to political force majeure events, the host
government, or the Power Purchasers, may ultimately be made to
bear the costs by way of an increase in the Monthly Capacity Pay-
ments, payable to the Power Developer.
3.2.4.4. Type of Equity Structure- Variation of Financing
Structure and Legal Organization to Accomplish
Risk-Spreading Objectives
At least three variations in the equity structure and legal or-
ganization of an IPP investment have been devised by Project Par-
ticipants in order to accomplish risk-spreading objectives: (i) the
Power Developer may seek equity participation from the EPC Con-
tractor, O&M Contractor, or Fuel Supplier as a means of enhancing
proper project performance ("Vendor Equity Financing"); (ii) the
Power Developer may seek equity participation from the host gov-
ernment in order to reduce Political Risks ("Government Participa-
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tion"); and (iii) IPP investments may also be structured as the Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) or Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT)
model, which, for decades, has brought about several large-scaled
infrastructure development projects in the "Third World." This
model spreads project risks to the international public sector, via
Multilateral Financing such as World Bank funding, or funding by
the Regional Development Banks.
339
These risk-spreading mechanisms, however, may occasion new
vices, which can be examined by scrutinizing the special legal is-
sues raised by the aforementioned financing and structural varia-
tions.
3.2.4.4.1. Vendor Equity Financing
Within the Design-Build model, the EPC Contractor may opt to
be included in the owner-developer consortium or Project Entity.
This is called the "Vendor Equity" structure of financing, referring
to the inclusion of services or good providers or suppliers (" Ven-
dors") in project ownership. 340 In IPP investments, Vendor Equity
typically includes equity interest held by the EPC Contractor, the
O&M Contractor, or the Fuel Supplier.341 (For example, in the Viet-
nam Deal, the IOGC who found gas upstream might decide to
undertake the development of IPP midstream as a Power Devel-
oper. In that case, the IOGC would own both the fuel and the
Power-Generation Facility, meaning it would be selling fuel to it-
self in a Vendor Equity structure.)
Overall, inclusion of Vendor Equity in the Project Entity in-
creases expertise base in the owner group, helps diversify capabili-
ties, secures loyalty from vendor-suppliers, and improves account-
339 For a discussion of Multilateral Institutions, see Duong, supra note 295, at
1181 n.21. See also, Vietnam Project to Help Meet Power Shortfall, supra note 299
(describing construction of power plant supported by funding and guarantees
provided by MIGA and the Asian Development Bank); Press Release, Siemens
AG, Siemens Builds Largest Private Power Plant in Vietnam (Oct. 13, 2003) [here-
infter Siemens Builds Largest Private Power Plant in Vietnam] (announcing the
construction of the largest combined-cycled power plant in Vietnam built by Sie-
mens Power Generation as a turn-key project structured under Build-Own-
Transfer ("BOT") legal framework), available at http://www.siemens.com/
page/1,3771,1103775-1-1100-0,00.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
340 Michael C. Loulakis, Managing Risks During the Construction of a Co-
generation Facility, Address Before the Association of Energy Engineers 8th Co-
generation & Independent Power Congress (June 15-16, 1993).
341 Id; see also Daniel Chao & Michael Selvin, Project Development and Finance:
The Evolving Role of the Engineering/Construction Contractor, in PROJECT FINANCE Y.B.
1994/1995, at 1 (Adrian Hornbook ed., 1994).
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ability by making vendor-suppliers an integral part of the project.
Quite often, Vendor Equity also increases the owner group's
chance of success in international competitive bidding (via the join-
ing of forces that form a de facto cartel). But the benefits gained
are also a potential source of vice: the Vendor Equity structure
concentrates a number of major international corporate players
into one owner group, typifying the often-taken-for-granted mo-
nopolistic characteristic of "Third World" economic development.
A group of allied companies - a self-selected group of dominant
players -controls the energy and utility sector, as well as a sub-
stantial portion of the economic landscape of a country or region.
Concerns raised by Vendor Equity go beyond the monopolistic
pattern it may illustrate. An inherent conflict exists in Vendor Eq-
uity analogous to conflicts of interest issues raised by "related-
party transactions" in U.S. financial disclosure law.342 A vendor
may have dual objectives -to participate in profit-sharing as a part
owner of the Project Entity, and, at the same time, to profit from
selling and supplying goods and services to the Project Entity of
which he/she is a part. Negotiation for services or supply con-
tracts between the Project Entity and the vendor will inherently in-
clude aspects of self-dealing, raising issues as to whether such ne-
gotiation is truly at arm's length.343 Yet, the deal and its related-
party transactions may or may not be disclosed, depending on the
342 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2004); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2004) (requiring issuer's
good faith duty to influence internal control systems of 50%-owned or less-than-
50%-owned foreign subsidiaries); SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (2004);
SEC Form 10-K, Item 13 (detailing the requirements of item 404 of Regulation S-
K), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formlO-k.pdf (last visited Feb.
22, 2005).
Overall, under state statutory law, related-party transactions must be ap-
proved by a majority of disinterested directors of public companies. See DEL.
CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 144 (2004) (setting the number of directors that must be pre-
sent to approve a transaction); Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(holding that related-party transactions with controlling shareholder must result
from arms-length negotiation).
Likewise, the SEC has cautioned that material related-party transactions need
to be discussed in Management Discussion and Analysis to the extent necessary
for the investing public to understand the company's current and prospective fi-
nancial results. See Disclosure in Mgmt.'s Discussion and Analysis about Off-
Balance Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Exchange
Act Release No. 33-8182, 68 Fed. Reg. 5982-01 (Feb. 5, 2003) (reinstating its January
2002 statement addressing, inter alia, related-party transactions).
343 Jane Stein, Vendor Equity - An Inherent Conflict, Address Before the In-
ternational Conference of International Power Project Development, Common
Problems and Practical Approaches (Oct. 1995).
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financial disclosure requirements under the law of either the home
or host jurisdiction. (Naturally, the legal systems of host jurisdic-
tions are often under-developed). If self-dealing results in high
costs, such costs are ultimately passed on to the inhabitants of the
"Third World," which eventually may lead to more austerity or
even more international debts incurred by the "Third World" na-
tion.
3.2.4.4.2. Government Participation
The same inherent conflict of interest exists in a Government
Participation structure, when the host government or its desig-
nated state-owned enterprise ("SOE") is included as equity owner
of the Project Entity. The Project Entity, partly owned by the host
government, may negotiate a Power-Purchase Agreement under
which electricity will be sold to the host government or its political
subdivisions as Power Purchasers. Thus, the government may be
acting in a dual capacity: as both buyer and seller. The Project En-
tity will negotiate price, terms, and conditions of the electricity sale
with the government as one of its shareholders, who also serves as
the market regulator. Expectations of arms-length dealings are
thus less linear and less clear. The chance exists for a corrupt or in-
efficient governmental apparatus (if that is the case) to be enriched
at the ultimate expense of "Third World" inhabitants, as well as the
shareholder public in the foreign investor's home base.
It is evident, therefore, that in both Vendor Equity and Gov-
ernment Participation, contractual measures are needed to elimi-
nate or minimize the risk of less than arm's length negotiations,
and to help delineate functions and capacities in order to prevent
self-dealing and price manipulation. (This is the reason why in
World Bank-funded IPP Transactions, the Multilateral Agency will
supposedly assist the host government in designing (i) a workable
utility rate-making or regulatory framework, and (ii) a model
Power Purchase Agreement based on sound economic principles.)
Preventive contractual measures may include: procedures to as-
sure arm's length terms; setting parameters for contractual capaci-
ties of the parties; defining terms and conditions for withdrawal in
the event of conflicts of interest; and/or similar safeguards to as-
sure both quality services and fair and equitable dealings. In off-
balance-sheet, unregulated "Third World" deals, these contractual
safeguards may result from the parties' own wills, rather than a
matter of mandatory protection for the larger public good. (The
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only regulation may rest in the hands of a self-interested "mon-
arch," whose lack of experience and capital may also be coupled
with a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy.)
Private-sector Project Participants, nonetheless, may view Gov-
ernment Participation as a necessity, as it brings to the IPP invest-
ment two principal risk-allocating advantages: (i) Government
Participation can qualify the project for Multilateral Financing,
since the Multilateral Agencies will only lend money to nation-
states or their SOEs and not to private parties; and (ii) Government
Participation can reduce Political Risks. The involvement of the
host government as an equity partner in the IPP investment helps
reduce the risks of materially adverse governmental action or gov-
ernmental interference -why interfere if the government owns a
stake in the project itself, since adverse or intervening sovereign ac-
tion may cut against the government's own commercial interest?
For example, in Facility construction, Government Participation al-
leviates such political risks as government-imposed changes in site
conditions. (In the Design-Build model, the owner-developer often
undertakes the entire responsibility over information and condi-
tions regarding project sites, including land, access, right of way,
existing core facilities, as well as support infrastructure, typically
owned or controlled by today's "monarchs." Therefore, it is bene-
ficial, efficient and desirable for the project if the host government
occupies the owner-developer role.) Now that the "monarch" has
entered the deal as a shareholder-investor, it will have all the in-
centive needed to support the project long-term and to protect its
foreign partner, who happens to control the technology needed for
the construction and operation of the Facility.
3.2.4.4.3. The Build-Operate-Transfer or Build-Own-
Operate-Transfer (BOT/BOOT) Legal Model for
Infrastructure Building
To further the risk-allocation goal of a Government Participa-
tion structure, a separate legal model has been devised and made
applicable to the development of "Third World" infrastructure,
called BOT or BOOT. The terms are self-explanatory. In the
BOT/ BOOT structure, the developer builds, owns and operates the
Facility for a definite term. After a period of time (long enough for
the developer to recoup its investment and earn the desired profit),
the developer is contractually obligated to transfer the Facility to
the host government or its designated SOE, which will then own
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and operate the infrastructure from that point forward. This trans-
fer of ownership and operation satisfies the host country's national
interest, and enables the infrastructure to become a public opera-
tion. Initially, the developing nation has no technology or manage-
rial know-how to construct and operate infrastructure systems,
and must therefore invite foreign participation in those projects.
344
Eventually, the government would want infrastructure to be part
of the political economy, free from foreign control.
Because of the importance of infrastructure, many developing
nations have enacted laws or promulgated regulations establishing
the legal framework for the BOT/BOOT model, thereby elevating
the model into legal mandates. The local law mandating the
BOT/BOOT form for infrastructure investment projects may re-
quire the incorporation of a BOT Company or BOT Entity to serve as
the developer of a particular infrastructure project. 34s The
BOT/BOOT structure may also involve both Vendor Equity and
Government Participation, in which case both the vendor-supplier
group and the host government functionally become shareholders
of the BOT Entity.
For decades, the BOT/BOOT structure has channeled billions
of dollars of both private and public funding into "Third World"
economic development, and has become quite popular in Asia and
344 The principles behind the BOT and Built-Own-Operate-Transfer
("BOOT") structure date back to colonial days. In the past, incoming colonists
had to construct infrastructure and educate a small class of native collaborators
before economic exploitation of the native land and labor could take place. In that
sense, the colonized territories and population incidentally benefited from these
"good deeds" of the new rulers. After decolonization at the end of World War II,
the developing nations inherited the infrastructures and facilities previously built
and operated by colonist governments.
345 For example, in 1995, Vietnam promulgated its first BOT Regulations, re-
quiring the establishment of a BOT Company in which the government holds an
equity interest. See Wendy N. Duong, Legal Framework for IPP Projects in Viet-
nam (Feb. 1995) (unpublished paper prepared for Mobil Power Inc.) (on file with
author, cited with client permission). In 2001, Vietnam signed a contract for the
development of a 715 MW gas power plant with French state-owned Electricite de
France ("EDF") under the BOT scheme, making the power plant the first BOT pro-
ject awarded under international bidding procedures. See ASEAN Centre for En-
ergy, Vietnam Signs Phu My 2.2 BOT Contract (Sept. 27, 2001) (discussing estab-
lishment of the BOT Meco Company, sponsored by a French led-consortium to
operate the gas-fired power plant in Vietnam), available at http://www.
aseanenergy.org/information/news/2001/october/reserve/newsOlsept.htm
(last visited Feb. 22, 2005); see also Siemens Builds Largest Private Power Plant in
Vietnam, supra note 339 (announcing the construction of the Phu My 3 combined-
cycled power plant built by Siemens Power Generation as a turn-key project struc-
tured under BOT legal framework).
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Latin America.34 6 Its popularity in Africa, central Asia, and certain
parts of central or Eastern Europe will undoubtedly be forthcom-
ing, if not already in existence. If the BOT Entity involves Gov-
ernment Participation, the BOT Entity may qualify for Multilateral
Financing, 347 since the Multilateral Agencies will only loan money
to member states, not to the private sector (with the exception of
the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the commercial arm of
the World Bank).348
The application of the BOT/BOOT legal norm to an IPP Trans-
action begins with the prerequisite finding that the Power Genera-
tion Facility, as well as any gas processing, liquefaction, and trans-
portation facilities (such as gas pipelines), be part of national
346 See, e.g., Mauel, supra note 320, at 39 n.6 (noting BOT schemes in China,
Guatemala, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam).
347 For a definition of Multilateral Financing, see generally Harold Dichter,
Legal Implications of an Asia-Pacific Economic Grouping, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 99
(1995). For example, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
("IBRD" or the "World Bank") lends money to member states for specific recon-
struction and development projects. See Articles of Agreement of the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dec. 27, 1945, art. I, 60 Stat.
1440, 1440-41, 2 U.N.T.S. 134. The World Bank also aims to promote foreign capi-
tal by means of guarantees and loan participation in investment projects spon-
sored by the private sector, and to conduct business "with due regard to the effect
of international investment on business conditions in the territories of
members .. " Id. at 1440. In practice, this goal has been typically translated into
IBRD funding of infrastructure-building projects.
The Regional Development Banks ("RDBs") share similar functions and goals
as the World Bank Group. The African, Asian, and Inter-American Development
Banks all have similar mandates as the IBRD. In contrast, the IMF is not a "devel-
opment" institution, although its governance is similar to that of the development
banks. The IMF is a fiscal and monetary monitoring organization which helps
member states with funding to address macroeconomic issues. Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, art. I, 60 Stat. 1401,
2 U.N.T.S. 39.
348 The International Finance Corporation ("IFC") provides both equity in-
vestments under its own name, as well as debt financing for the private sector. As
a multilateral lender, it may serve as the lender of record for a commercial bank
syndication, thereby boosting the private sector's confidence in the project. As a
matter of policy, the IFC will not take a controlling interest or majority position in
a project. Typically, the IFC will only fund up to twenty-five percent of a
greenfield project, and under its own guidelines, may take an equity interest in
the project of up to five to ten percent. See International Finance Corporation, Ba-
sic Facts About ITC (providing an overview of the function and mission of the IFC),
at http://www.ifc.org/about/basicfacts/basicfacts.html (last visited Feb. 22,
2005). The IFC's Global PowerFund helps bring private international investors to
privately sponsored IPP investments in the developing economies. Blumental,
supra note 305, at 287 ("the IFC's Global PowerFund invests equity and provides
subordinated debt and completion guarantees for construction of power pro-
jects").
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infrastructure building. This can be a legal conclusion, either
clearly stated in the local law, or otherwise accepted as a norm of
practice by the business, legal, financial, or multilateral commu-
nity. Without electricity as a critical infrastructure or pipeline sys-
tems to deliver energy sources to the market, the national economy
and natural resources foreign investment can be retarded or inca-
pacitated. Once the IPP investment and all support facilities have
qualified as infrastructure building, with Government Participa-
tion, the IPP Transaction and related deals may receive World
Bank or Regional Development Bank funding and assistance, in
addition to private Project Financing. The BOT/BOOT structure
that encompasses Government Participation and combines both
private Project Financing and Multilateral Financing enables the
Power Developer to accomplish two risk-allocation objectives: (i)
to reduce Political Risks by according the host government a direct
long-term financial interest in the project, and (ii) to spread in-
vestment risks to inhabitants of the developed nations. If the pro-
ject fails, the corporate sponsor can be risk-free, except for its
chance to make a profit, or any equity contribution it may have
made out of its own pocket.
In summary, the midstream segment of the Vietnam Deal is
a classic scenario for the structuring of a BOT/BOOT legal model
that involves both Vendor Equity and Government Participation.
Such a structure leaves much room and opportunity for related-
party transactions tainted with classic conflicts of interest and po-
tential self-dealing- one Project Participant may have its foot in
several functions in the project. The structure evidences a close-
knit, long-term, and interdependent relationship among private
Project Participants, the Multilateral Institutions, and the "mon-
arch."349 In masterminding and implementing such a structure, the
349 See George Shultz, Ten Commandments for Evaluating Risk on Private
Infrastructure Projects, Address Before the Bechtel Power International Private
Power Forum (Nov. 9, 1995) (Mr. Shultz was formerly President of Bechtel):
My third commandment is: We have to keep forcing ourselves to think of
creative ways to make agreements work[,] . .. look at the different risks
and try to figure out who is going to bear what risk in a careful way. It
may be things like production sharing with host governments, as a way
to deal with these issues .... If you are going to buy a plant, make sure
the government gets the subsidy out and raises the price of the product
before you buy. If you are going to build a plant and electricity is priced
way low.., if you can get the government to get that price change before
you enter the field, it is going to be a tremendous advantage because we
all know that, if you are the guy that is raising the price of electricity by a
lot, and that is what privatization means, then you are in deep
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IOGC that has discovered gas as fuel supply for a gas-fired Power-
Generation Facility will tend to look to dominant industry players
that share its corporate philosophy and investment style, especially
those who have established track records of successful partner-
ships with the IOGC and the same "monarch." This means that the
selected Project Participants may have participated in joint opera-
torship or may have held joint interests with the IOGC elsewhere
in the global economy, and/or may have successfully partnered
with the host government in other national projects. In fact, typi-
cally all dominant players must have the approval and blessings of
the host government. Close-knit partnerships with "monarchs" by
a group of self-selected players continue to be the undeniable and
inescapable profit-making pattern for the international petroleum
and energy sector in "Third World" economic development.
Needless to say, cloaking an allegedly corrupt government as
the project sponsor and equity owner in order to guarantee pay-
ment and profit for the private sector via Multilateral or Bilateral
financing can be a dangerous proposition. This danger is amply
illustrated in the scandal involving the outrageously costly and
hazardous Bataan Nuclear Power Project in the Philippines.350
Bataan was the biggest independent power project undertaken in
the history of the Philippines, constructed in 1977 and completed
in 1984. Activists allege that the project was a means for the cor-
rupt Marcos government to enrich itself. By sponsoring the project
and partnering with U.S.-based Westinghouse, the Marcos regime
was able to obtain public funding via the U.S. Export-Import Bank
("ExIm"). 35l Such public money was used to pay, among others,
Westinghouse (including, naturally, its desired profit for construct-
ing and outfitting the nuclear plant), and to benefit the Marcos re-
gime allegedly by way of illicit commissions payable to their al-
trouble! ....
[Y]ou probably want to think about international partners. The IFC is a
leading candidate, and the World Bank group generally, because obvi-
ously it gives you a certain kind of insurance policy, because countries do
not want to alienate this potential source of future finance ... (emphasis
added).
350 See PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIUS DEBT: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE
THIRD WORLD'S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 165 (1991) (discussing new governments
dishonoring onerous contracts entered into by previous regimes not recognized
by the people).
351 See discussion in Duong supra note 295, at 1182 n.22, 1260-61 n.213.
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leged "cronies".352 According to activists, international inspectors
considered Bataan a health, safety and environmental hazard, and
the Philippines ended up experiencing severe outages leading to a
national power crisis, since Bataan never produced the expected
volume of electricity. Notwithstanding the plant's hazardous and
inoperational status, the "beneficiaries" of Bataan, the "consumers,
taxpayers, and host communities" of the Philippines, and not the
ousted Marcos regime officials, ended up having to pay the ExIm
debts (a total of direct loans and guarantees estimated at $900 mil-
lion). These loan obligations contributed substantially to the Phil-
ippines' impoverished conditions and debt crisis.353
3.2.5. A Critical Look at Project Financing and the Reality of
Large-Scale "Third World" Economic Development
Despite its utility, the BOT/BOOT structure creates at least
three windfalls in the current funding patterns for "Third World"
development projects: (i) the interdependence between Multilat-
eral Financing and Project Financing, and the stimulating effect the
former produces upon the latter; (ii) the triple benefits enjoyed by
corporate sponsors whose projects qualify for Project Financing;
and (iii) the real-life influence name-brand corporate identities may
have on the risk assessment process that determines eligibility for
Project Financing, thereby confirming the monopolistic and exclu-
sive nature of large-scale "Third World" development project
sponsorship.
These three windfalls are discussed below.
3.2.5.1. The Interdependence between Multilateral Financing
and Project Financing
Among the most profound impacts of the BOT/BOOT struc-
ture is the effect that such a structure may produce upon project
risk assessment in the determination of Project Financing eligibil-
ity. Not only does the BOT/BOOT structure enable public funding
such as World Bank or Regional Development Bank loans, but it
may also increase the success rate for qualifying related projects for
private Project Financing, thereby stimulating the involvement of
the private sector. In that sense, Multilateral Financing and Project
352 Maristella Cardenas, ECAs in the Philippine Power Sector and the Continuing
Debt Problem (Dec. 12, 2003), at http://jubileesouth.org/news/EpZyVy
uAV1SMRrFluL.shtrnl (last visited Feb. 4,2005)
353 Id.
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Financing are interdependent. The availability of Multilateral Fi-
nancing in BOT/BOOT and other infrastructure projects motivates
the corporate sector to seek partnerships with the Multilateral
Agencies in nation building, even if the corporate goals are purely
profit-seeking and not nation building. Such a partnership can
generate more FDIs for the host country, not only because private
investors will benefit from the availability of infrastructure, but
also because Multilateral Financing acts as assurance for private
lenders and financiers, and hence can practically become a risk
management device to mitigate against the host environment's Po-
litical Risks. In simple terms, Multilateral Financing has the same
effect as the corporate investor's de facto insurance policy.354 The
presence of Multilateral Financing and their credit support facili-
ties in a developing nation helps ease the private sector's anxiety,
constituting the type of backing by the developed nations that
make private investors feel safe.
Consequently, not only is the private sector more likely to in-
vest, but it will actively assist the host government in meeting Mul-
tilateral Funding qualifications. Specifically, although the World
Bank does not fund upstream energy projects, it generally supports
privatization of certain segments of the energy chain that may be
considered part of nations' infrastructure building, and hence will
finance and/or guarantee projects that fall within its funding crite-
ria.355 As of the end of the millennium, a commentator reported
that out of the $17 to $20 billion of the World Bank's annual fund-
ing, approximately $2 to $3 billion goes to IPP and approximately
$1 billion goes to oil and gas midstream projects.356 The pipeline
project in the Republic of Chad is an example of World Bank sup-
354 Regarding one example of corporate strategies in partnerships with gov-
ernments and the Multilaterals, see Shultz, supra note 349.
355 The criteria for Multilateral Funding of reconstruction and economic de-
velopment projects should be revisited. For example, "infrastructure" develop-
ment criteria should include the provision of information technology and the out-
fitting of educational projects. In today's modem world, informational
technology and education should qualify as infrastructure, just as roads, bridges,
dams, electricity, and telecommunications have qualified as infrastructure in the
past. An educated workforce with access to information technology is the key to
economic development as well as the promotion of democratic principles against
authoritarianism or isolationism. (In that sense, information technology repre-
sents a threat to dictatorships.) Liberalizing the definition of "infrastructure" will
also enable participation by smaller and medium-sized entrepreneurships in
"Third World" economic development, both from the foreign investor community
as well as from the native community.
356 Blumental, supra note 305, at 276.
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port available to the oil and gas industry in its partnership with the
Republic.357 In addition, the gas development project offshore
Vietnam sponsored by British Petroleum ("BP"), BP's accompany-
ing pipeline project to transport its gas onshore, and the construc-
tion of gas-fired power-generation plants in Vietnam using off-
shore gas as fuel, supported by the Asian Development Bank and
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA"), are all
evidence of an integrated IPP Transaction benefiting from the
combination of Multilateral Financing, BOT financing, and private
sector investment.35 8 IOGCs, Power Developers, their multina-
tional contractors and suppliers, as well as their private bank syn-
dicates will readily cooperate and assist host governments in the
application for Multilateral Funding and credit support.
The same stimulating effect has amply been observed with re-
spect to loan conditions established by the International Monetary
Fund ("IMF") for the developing economies. Although the IMF
has no direct role in the financing of international energy projects,
its role as a global economic and monetary monitoring institution
greatly impacts the risk assessment process performed by private
lenders, at least in two separate aspects:
First, payment for energy as a commodity in a host country
may be made in the local "soft" currency and must be converted
into a "hard" currency such as the U.S. dollar or the euro to service
project debts and to be repatriated as investor returns. IMF poli-
cies and rules for its member states, articulated in its Articles of
Agreement, 359 purportedly help stabilize and prevent local cur-
rency collapses, as well as reduce the risk of currency fluctuations
Fin the local economy. Thus, a host country's membership in the
IMF can serve as a bedrock to ease private lenders' anxiety.
Second, as a Bretton Woods institution, the IMF lends money to
member states to help correct these countries' fiscal problems. IMF
loan conditions, reflective of its economic policies, are purportedly
designed to assure repayment of "Third World" debts. Accord-
ingly, private bankers lending money to "Third World" projects
have looked to IMF loan conditions as "risk management" tools,
357 See Duong, supra note 295, at 1178 n.15 (discussing the Republic of Chad).
358 Pipeline from Vietnam's Offshore Gas Fields Reaches Land, supra note 299;
Siemens Builds Largest Private Power Plant in Vietnam, supra note 339; see also
Vietnam Project to Help Meet Power Shortfall, supra note 299 (describing the con-
struction and operation of a new Vietnamese power plant).
359 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 821 (1987) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT].
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and IMF loan conditions have typically been incorporated into pri-
vate loan agreements, serving as "risk assurances" to stimulate
private banks' funding of "Third World" development projects.
360
Syndicates of private lenders have "ridden on the coat-tails" of not
only the IMF but also other "development" Multilateral Agencies,
at times creating de facto "creditors' cartels."
361
When pushed to the limit, this stimulating effect and over-
reliance on the presence of the Multilateral Agencies in a host
country can easily result in risk assessment errors committed by
the private banking industry. Risk assessment errors can even be
made by the Multilateral and Bilateral Agencies themselves, since
360 See, e.g., ERIK DENTERS, LAW AND POLICY OF IMF CONDITIONALITY 4 (1996)
("Practically all creditors trust the IMF's, judgement, and are only prepared to
provide support if the debtor[,] in consultation with the Fund, carries out an ad-
justment programme."); Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Aiding the Transformation of
Economies: Is the Fund's Conditionality Appropriate to the Task?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV.
1943, 1948 (1994) ("The result in the 1980s was arrangements among private bank-
ers, indebted nations, and the Fund that linked extensions of both time to repay
old borrowings and new bank loans to the applicant country's agreement to ac-
cept the Fund's prescriptions for regaining economic health.").
361 For a discussion of the relationship between banking regulations and IMF
goals, see Stephen Zamora, Regulating the Global Banking Network - What Role (if
any) for the IMF?, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1953, 1967-73 (1994) (comparing regulatory
issues with the "principal concerns of international monetary relations"). See also
SIR JOSEPH GOLD, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND PAMPHLET No. 39, ORDER IN IN-
TERNATIONAL FINANCE, THE PROMOTION OF IMF STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS, AND THE
DRAFTING OF PRIVATE LOAN .AGREEMENTS (1982); Jonathan David Aronson, Fi-
nancial Institutions in the International Monetary System, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
341 (1980); Joseph Gold, The Growing Role of the IMF's Stand-By Arrangements, 1984
J. Bus. LAw 315;.
Some scholars have used the experience of Tanzania in Africa as an example
to criticize the effectiveness of the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") global
economic goals and strategies, viewing both the World Bank and the IMF as
agents for the restriction of the welfare state. Tanzania was a stable democracy
that could not continue to afford social programs that had produced the highest
literacy rates in Africa and a tolerable life for Tanzanians. After fifteen years of
IMF funding, half of the population allegedly live in poverty, although the coun-
try's macroeconomic picture has brightened with reduced inflation and growing
GDP. Tony McAdams, Globalization: New Demands for the Legal Environment of
Business Course, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. EDuc. 239, 253 n.94 (citing Eric Pooley, The IMF:
Dr. Death?, TIME, Apr. 24, 2000, at 4); see also Press Release No. 04/18, IMF, State-
ment by IMF Deputy Managing Director Agustin Carstens at the Conclusion of a
Visit to Tanzania (Feb. 3, 2004) ("In the past few years, Tanzania has made sub-
stantial progress in establishing the macroeconomic stability and deepening the
structural reforms .... Despite these achievements, much remains to be done if
Tanzania is to increase growth and raise living standards .... Participants em-
phasized the need for the IMF to be more flexible in its policy advice...").
Case studies such as Tanzania need empirical data support, rather than just
editorialized conclusions.
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one agency may undoubtedly be influenced by the activities of
others within the same country or region, let alone the fact that
these institutions typically sharenation-state memberships.
The principles of risk management are not an exact science ca-
pable of mathematical precision at all times. Many subjective fac-
tors come into play. The ultimate inquiry rests in whether or not
the financier or lender feels assured and comfortable with the
prospect of recouping its funds together with the desired interest.
In reality, especially in an international IPP Transaction, this level
of assurance can be obtained in several ways, some of which may
have little to do with the mathematical calculation of probability or
risks. In fact, it is possible that the more substantial the financial
stake is, the more the assurance is stimulated by psychological
comfort or the totality of circumstances. The interdependence be-
tween Multilateral Financing and private Project Financing illus-
trates this point. What's more, the interdependent, stimulating ef-
fect described above also leads to the undeniable fact that all
Multilateral Agencies, and not just the IMF, become the sheriff,
regulator, insurer, and rescuer of both public and private "Third
World"" debts, even if some of them are not officially in the busi-
ness of providing Political Risk Insurance -a function and spe-
cialty exclusively reserved for agencies such as MIGA, ExIm, or the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC").362 Further,
when private and public loans are defaulted, debt or loan work-out
solutions are often proposed or imposed by the Multilateral Agen-
cies and/or major nation-contributors such as the United States to
prevent global economic crises. The proposals and impositions
may lead to more severe loan conditions, which in turn will cause
more austerity and negative social and economic impact on the
"Third World" population.363
362 See Duong, supra note 295, n.21, n.213 (identifying and describing the Mul-
tilateral and Bilateral Institutions).
363 For a discussion of unresolved issues associated with sovereign insol-
vency, see, e.g., Stephen Zamora, supra note 361, at 1968 ("If it is true that banks
are part of the problem, then the IMF cannot continue to ignore the regulation of
private banking activities .... "); Philip J. Power, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the
Secondary Market and Its Implications for Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
2701, 2706-23 (1996) (reviewing the sovereign debt crisis of the 1980s, global re-
sponses, and options for avoiding the "nightmare scenario" that could result from
the next such crisis); Rory MacMillan, Towards a Sovereign Debt WorkOut System, 16
N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 57, 61-73 (1995) (discussing problems associated with sov-
ereign insolvencies).
There has been no established international legal framework for sovereign
bankruptcy. As one of the largest contributors to the IMF and World Bank sys-
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3.2.5.2. The Triple Benefits Enjoyed by the Corporate Sponsor
Whose Infrastructure Projects Qualify for Project
Financing
From the discussion above, the following scenario becomes
highly likely: if the IPP Transaction (and all related projects that
may qualify as infrastructure building, such as gas processing, gas
liquefaction, and pipeline construction) is structured as the
BOT/BOOT model eligible for both Multilateral Financing and
Project Financing, corporate sponsors that partner with "mon-
archs" and Multilateral Institutions may enjoy at least three bene-
fits.
The first benefit results from the fact that foreign investors need
the country's infrastructure in order to conduct their profit-making
enterprises. The same infrastructure may even benefit the foreign
investors' various projects in the region and not just in a single
country. One can argue that under normal circumstances, the cost
of the infrastructure needed to support the investor's various pro-
jects should be considered business expenses to be borne by the in-
vestor out of its own pocket (no more, no less than overhead costs
any business enterprise may have to outfit, or no more, no less
than the costs of hiring workers for production). Yet, if the corpo-
rate investor chooses to sponsor the infrastructure project, it can
even make profit from the infrastructure that supports its other
profit-making enterprises. 364 In other words, the private investor
tems, and in the interest of major U.S. banking syndicates who financed interna-
tional projects, the United States has undertaken to structure "Third World" debt
"workout" solutions. In the "Baker Plan" -named after the then Secretary of
State-new loans were made to help the developing nations pay interests, thus
preserving the "book value" of defaulted loans. This short-term solution of inject-
ing more funding for the Third World to satisfy interest obligations naturally re-
sulted in tougher new loan conditions and more austerity for the developing
economies. In contrast, the subsequent "Brady Plan" offered more long-term so-
lutions: easing existing IMF loan conditions, reduction of debt value, and provi-
sion of new financial guarantees to stimulate more private capital and export
growth. Aronson, supra note 361; Power, supra note 363; see also Lichtenstein, su-
pra note 360 (discussing the G-7 Nations' efforts to use the existing IMF structure
to disburse aid to Russia).
Recently, a movement referred to as the "Jubilee 2000" has advocated for-
giveness for "Third World" debts as the socially desirable solution in the best in-
terest of the global community. Tony McAdams, supra note 361 (citing Diane
Coyle, Wealthy Nations Should Cancel Third World Debt to Make Amends for Pollution,
THE INDEP. (London), Sept. 20, 1999, at 15); Paul Solman, Forgiving the Debts?,
ONLINE NEWSHOUR, Apr. 11, 2000, at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/
economy/jan-juneOO/debt_4-11.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
364 Recognizing this incidental benefit to the foreign investor, member states
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can take two bites of the same apple - to benefit from the infra-
structure and, at the same time, profit from the construction of the
infrastructure as a project sponsor. Further, by partnering with the
"monarch" and co-sponsoring the infrastructure project via Multi-
lateral Financing, corporate sponsors can spread investment risks
and transfer the costs of the very infrastructure that serves them to
other nation-states. Since the host country that borrows Multilat-
eral Funding will have to pay back those loans out of its treasury,
the risks are ultimately borne by the poor citizenry of the "Third
World."
Second, although eligibility for Project Financing is in principle
supposed to rest solely on the evaluation of the project's economic
viability, in reality, private bankers may be influenced by the
availability of Multilateral Financing in the project. Hence, corpo-
rate investors seeking Project Financing stand to gain from this re-
laxed risk assessment process. Where Multilateral Funding has
been made available to a project, corporate investors may stand a
much greater chance of receiving favorable private Project Financ-
ing in the same project or in related ventures, including the con-
struction of all other support facilities necessary for their invest-
ment.
Third, classic Project Financing acts as an effective risk transfer
mechanism for corporate investors because of its Non-Recourse na-
ture, thereby constituting another layer of benefit. If the project
fails, the corporate sponsor is practically risk-free (other than any
"down payment" or out-of-pocket equity that it may have ad-
vanced, depending on the project).
On one hand, the utility of, and justification for, Project Financ-
ing in "Third World" economic development are evident. Project
Financing as a concept stimulates private investment in the "Third
World," especially in projects crucial to nation building. Without
Project Financing, the undeveloped areas of the world will remain
undeveloped, since foreign aids among nations and even Multilat-
eral Financing cannot adequately supply the necessary funding
and carry the financial weight. Private bankers should be encour-
aged to count on the ascertainable income stream evidenced by
have imposed or negotiated for "infrastructure payments" as part of funding ad-
vances required of the IOGC in petroleum joint venture contracts between the
IOGC and the state. See, e.g., Peter Goodwin, Mobil's Joint Venture Experience
with State-Owned Companies: Kazakhstan, Presented at the Conference on Model
Petroleum Contract (Feb. 12-13, 1998) (cited with client permission). However, this
practice may not be universal.
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contractual rights in order to pour more funding into the "Third
World." Without Project Financing, developers may hesitate to ini-
tiate costly development projects in the unfamiliar territories of the
"Third World."
On the other hand, Project Financing can create an anomaly. If
the high investment risks do not fall upon the corporate sponsor,
under established risk management principles these risks do not
just disappear. They are simply shifted elsewhere, ultimately to
the group of people who are the least equipped and the most ill-
prepared to bear the loss. In that sense, the economic theories be-
hind risk management philosophies discussed earlier have indeed
been betrayed! The accuracy of risk assessment methods depends
on whether the information taken into consideration is reliable and
accurate. Imperfect information makes imperfect risk assessment
and, therefore, results in flawed risk treatment. If, for any reason,
the project fails, or the Power Developer goes under and fails to
perform (as in the case of Enron), bankers will hurriedly foreclose
on the project's physical assets or will take over the stream of in-
come. If there is no income stream or the physical assets are in-
adequate or otherwise not salvable to satisfy the debts (as in the
case of the Bataan project in the Philippines discussed earlier),
bankers will have to face and absorb their risk-assessment errors,
without recourse to the developer's corporate assets in the home ju-
risdiction or elsewhere. In the end, two groups of inhabitants ul-
timately bear the risk of loss: (1) the inhabitants and taxpayers of
the capital-exporting countries will bear the financial impact of
bank syndicates' risk assessment mistakes when loans are de-
faulted; and (2) the inhabitants of the "Third World," or the capital-
importing countries, end up having no electricity yet still have to
pay project debts. Ultimately, the poor citizenry gets poorer and
poorer, having less and less economic means or disposable income
because governments will seek to levy and make good the financial
losses from their citizenry. In the worst scenario, since an IPP in-
vestment, viewed as an infrastructure development project, is typi-
cally funded both by private money (through Project Financing) and
quasi-public money (through Multilateral Financing), the default
of the private sector sponsor may also cause the "Third World" na-
tion - a sovereign sponsor - to default on its international financial
obligations,365 and a transnational insolvency problem may arise,
365 See Aronson, supra note 361 (discussing the possible monetary instability if
the developing countries refuse to meet their bank debt obligations).
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leading to global economic crises.366 The use of Project Financing
as the corporate sponsor's risk-allocation mechanism is fatally
flawed because it ultimately protects the corporate sponsor, the
party who is in the best position to assess future risks of loss, and
who benefits the most from the financial reward of the project, all
to the detriment of those whom the project is supposed to serve.
Under scientific risk management principles, those supposed bene-
ficiaries occupy the least advantageous and the least equipped po-
sition to prevent or control the loss. In fact, they have no control at
all. The ultimate noble goal of "Third World" economic develop-
ment in the name of free market, in the worst case, will work to the
severe disadvantage of the poor and the weak.
3.2.5.3. The Monopolistic, Exclusive, and "Brand-Name"
Nature of Large-Scale Project-Financed Transactions
in Real World Application
If a giant corporate sponsor is suffering financially or its
management is deteriorating due to inefficiency or misconduct, the
signs of financial ills and troubled corporate operation will mani-
fest themselves and trickle down all operating units. Ultimately
these problems will reach those international projects funded via
Project Finance an ocean away. Yet, because of pre-Sarbanes-Oxley
"off-balance sheet" accounting treatment, coupled with the illusory
psychological comfort created by brand-name glory, the signifi-
cance of potential financial and management ills manifested in in-
ternational projects easily escaped the immediate attention of the
investing and analyst community, making the prospect of financial
disasters appear further removed or remote. As an incidental
benefit of the Enron scandal, the prophylactic Sarbanes-Oxley ar-
guably helps prevent this misleading appearance by requiring dis-
closures of certain "off-balance sheet" arrangements; but Sarbanes-
Oxley does not change a Non-Recourse Financing transaction into
a Full-Recourse financing transaction and, hence, does not help the
lending community and the public it serves. Nor does Sarbanes-
Oxley help prevent or correct the lending community's risk man-
agement errors, committed at the time the project is being contem-
plated, not at the subsequent time of disclosure in public filings or
366 See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communication,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2531, 2532 (1996) ("A transnational insolvency problem arises
whenever a multinational commercial enterprise falls into general default on its
obligations.").
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reports, after the deal has been finalized. The Enron scandal illus-
trates the danger of how brand-name corporate identities can psy-
chologically distort and imbalance the private bankers' risk as-
sessment process.
367
The Enron 1999 10K Annual Report discussed the gas-fired
power plant in the Maharashtra State of India (India's industrial
heartland south of Bombay), developed by the Dabhol Power
Company ("Dabhol"), majority owned by Enron.368 Dabhol was
allegedly India's largest FDI project, valued at $2.9 billion.369 Dab-
hol's revenues were counted as part of the bigger business seg-
ment, Enron Wholesales Energy Services ("Wholesales"), and re-
ported collectively in Enron's Financial Statements as part of
Wholesales' business unit.370 Overall, by fiscal year 2000-the year
preceding the scandal, Enron's Wholesales Energy Operations and
Services, including power development and infrastructure projects
in the developing markets, were reported as Enron's largest busi-
ness segment, with a sustained growth rate of 48% annually over a
five-year period,37' both domestically and internationally. Yet, by
the end of 2001, when the scandal was first uncovered, the 2,184-
megawatt plant in India had been shut down allegedly as a result
of an ongoing dispute between Dabhol and its only customer, the
state utility authority of Maharashtra, because of non-payment for
the power supply.372 Around this same time, Dabhol also served
notice of terminating its sale of power to the state utility authority.
This meant that the income stream from which loan proceeds were
serviced would not be forthcoming.
Enron's financial meltdown threw the Dabhol project into more
uncertainty. In the middle of the power purchase payment dis-
pute, news from the United States arrived that Jeffrey Skilling, the
CEO who allegedly was instrumental in Enron's transformation
from a power development and pipeline business to an energy
367 All allegations and facts discussed in this Article are based on public press
reports and public filings available in the SEC's Edgar System, http://www.sec.
gov/edgar.html.
368 ENRON CORP., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2000).
369 Saritha Rai, New Doubts on Enron's India Investment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
2001, at W1.
370 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 368, at 14.
371 Id.
372 Id.; Saritha Rai, India: Dabhol Seeks Payment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2001, at
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trading company, 373 had resigned after only six months on the job.
Skilling's resignation forewarned the corporate giant's subsequent
financial collapse.374 At some point during the following months,
Dabhol's core physical assets were allegedly listed on the high pri-
ority sale by either the financially distressed Enron or its prospec-
tive buyer, Dynergy, Inc., of Houston, Texas, who eventually re-
scinded the acquisition after conducting a due diligence review of
Enron's operations and records. The press reported that a consor-
tium of Indian lenders led by the Industrial Development Bank of
India, which apparently were once impressed by the mighty
brand-name of Enron, and whose exposure in the form of loans
and guarantees amounted to approximately $1.5 billion, unsuccess-
fully attempted to stop the transfer of the Dabhol assets during En-
ron's financial meltdown. 375 Assuming that the transfer actually
occurred arguably pursuant to U.S. bankruptcy law, who but the
poor people of India and its industrial heartland will bear the con-
sequence of this asset loss and the stand-still of the Maharashtra
power-generation system?
The Dabhol power purchase dispute originated long before the
Enron financial scandal, presenting peculiar facts and allegations,
yet receiving relatively modest attention, if any at all, from the U.S.
investing or analyst community, perhaps due to the fact that the
dispute was couched as an incident of a nation-state buyer's de-
fault in a developing economy so far away, with cultural and busi-
ness practices so alien to the American mindset. Or, perhaps it is
widely known to the investing public and its analyst community
that such a project was Non-Recourse to Enron. The peculiar dis-
pute was reported by the international press as early as February
2001, when Dabhol sought to invoke a $50 million sovereign guar-
373 The transformation of Enron coincided with the deregulation trend in the
power and utility markets. See Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets be
Trusted? The Effect of the Rise and Fall of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 Hous. Bus. &
TAx L.J. 1, 11-25 (2004) (hypothesizing that the deregulation of energy markets
was a factor in Enron's expansion).
374 Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Alex Berenson, Enron's Chief Executive Quit After
Only 6 Months in Job, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 15, 2001, at C1. On February 19, 2004, Skill-
ing plead not guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and securities fraud and
was released on a five million dollar bail. Associated Press, Ex-Enron CEO In-
dicted, Feb. 19, 2004, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4311642 (last
visited Jan. 26, 2004).
375 Unit of Enron is Challenged, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, at C12; Saritha Rai, In-
dia: Utility Transfer Notice, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 6, 2001, at W1. Public records do not
readily reveal the financing structure or capital sources for the remaining $1.4 bil-
lion invested in Dabhol.
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antee provided by the Indian government, allegedly because Ma-
harashtra had refused to pay for Enron's power supply.376 Both the
local and central governments refused to honor the guarantee, cit-
ing as reasons Enron's technical failures in meeting contractual
terms.377 The local utility buyer, in particular, complained about
Enron's exceedingly high prices (often calculated in accordance
with a long-term mathematical formula provided in the PPA).3
78
The dispute also halted the construction of Phase II of the power
plant project.379 U.S. diplomats, at that time, reportedly stood be-
hind Enron, warning that India's default on the sovereign guaran-
tee might endanger future FDI projects in the country.380 Appar-
ently, the mighty name Enron, at that time, stood parallel to the
American interest.
The circumstances surrounding the Dabhol dispute might have
suggested not only Enron's internal ills, but also a pattern of diffi-
culties in the relationship between the foreign Power Developer
and Maharashtra's government buyer in the implementation of the
relevant Power Purchase Agreement. This problem could certainly
be characterized and foreseen as a materialized Political Risk. The
risk, however, was not completely unforeseen, yet the lenders in-
volved did not seem to be affected by any such warnings, judging
from the scarcity of press reports relating to any public reaction by
the relevant lending community. The Dabhol project had experi-
enced difficulty caused by the relationship between Enron and the
local provincial government at the inception and during the early
phases of the project. The early signs of ills had generated a vol-
ume of rather scandalous publicity. As of 1994, Dabhol was re-
ported as the high-profiled power project that received India's full
sovereign attention and a promise of "fast-tracked approvals," evi-
denced ultimately by the twelve-year guarantee provided by the
central government to make good any defaults on bills unpaid by
the individual power buyer-provincial state. Perhaps this sover-
eign support was justified, since the $2.6 billion project was con-
ceived and made feasible by two brand-name U.S. corporate gi-
ants- Enron, of Houston, Texas, and General Electric Company, of
376 P.J. Anthony, Dabhol, Enron Unit in India, Invokes Payment Guarantee, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001, at C4.
377 Celia W. Dugger, Enron Payment Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2001, at W1.
378 Saritha Rai, New Delhi to Intervene In Dispute with Enron, supra note 372.
379 Saritha Rai, India: Power Plant Dispute Continues, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2001,
at W1.
380 Dugger, supra note 377.
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Fairfield, Connecticut. (General Electric is the known manufac-
turer-supplier of turbines and generators for power-generation fa-
cilities. 381 The U.S.-based international engineering and construc-
tion firm, Bechtel, was also allegedly involved in Dabhol as a
contractor.) 382
The Dabhol investment contract had been negotiated by Enron
with a previous state government headed by the then ruling politi-
cal party, as part of India's national movement for economic re-
form commenced in 1991. The reform movement allegedly re-
placed former socialist policies with more rigorous free-enterprise
implementation to attract more foreign investment from the West.
Subsequently, there was a change of guards in local government
leadership, and, well into the fall of 1995, the new local officials in
Maharashtra decided to cancel Dabhol, viewing it as "against the
interest of Maharashtra and its people."383 Local officials claimed
that the previous negotiation was one-sided and whatever Enron
received whatever it wanted. Likewise, the president of the oppo-
sition party in India reportedly claimed that Enron executives took
advantage of economic reforms, and were doling out bribes and
kickbacks to Maharashtra state politicians in order to secure the
power project. 384 Notwithstanding the controversy, by 1996, Dab-
hol was reported as "back on track,"385 and Enron resumed con-
struction, after reducing the costs charged for electricity in re-
sponse to nationalist objections, 386 and after receiving the
Maharashtra state's formal offer to revive the cancelled project.387
In July of 1996, Dabhol received final approval and blessings from
the Indian central government.388 Yet, by 2001, the Dabhol project
381 Emily L. Aitken, India Curries Favor With Foreign Investors, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Sept. 15, 1994.
382 ENRON CORP., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT (1994); ENRON CORP. 1994 ANNUAL
REPORT (1995); ENRON CORP., 1995 ANNUAL REPORT (1996); Eric Weiner, Canceled
Deal Sets Back Reforms in India, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 11, 1995, at 7.
383 Weiner, supra note 382.
384 Id.; see also ENRON CORP., 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 9-12 (1996) (disclosing a
dispute between Dabhol and Maharashtra; concluding that the outcome would
not have a materially adverse effect on Enron's financial position).
385 John F. Bums, Second Thoughts on India; Enron Project on Track, but Policy
Doubts Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1996, at 47.
386 Allen R. Myerson, Enron Agrees to Resume Work at Project in India, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 1996, at D2.
387 Associated Press, Enron Says India State Offers to Revive Big Power Project,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1996, at D4.
388 Associated Press, Enron Can Resume Big Indian Power Project, N.Y. TIMES
July 10, 1996, at D19; see also ENRON CORP., 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 9-13 (1997).
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was shut down, and the heatedly disputed income stream came to
a definite stop.38
9
The "brand-name" pitfall of Project Financing goes beyond the
type of risk assessment errors that might have contributed to Dab-
hol's depressing story. The substantial size and impact of large-
scaled Project-Financed transactions make them a natural fit for
sponsors that are major energy MNCs who bring with them to the
"Third World" their bankers, hotel chains, international law firms,
international accounting firms, international engineering firms, as
well as other brand-name international contractors. In fact, quite
often, the banks, law firms, accounting firms, and other service in-
dustries (the "Service Providers") will "go Third World" first, in
order to lay out the support structure for their wealthy clients, who
will then "go" second, only after their comfort level has been satis-
fied via the work of the Service Providers. The Service Providers
will send to the "Third World" those employees who uniquely can
demonstrate cultural and linguistic abilities, as well as the flexibil-
ity and courage to operate in "substandard" living and working
conditions of a transitional economy - commonly those "hyphen-
ated-Americans" whom America's "diversity project" helps re-
cruit. Quite often, when the Fortune 500 business executive's flight
hits the "Third World" runway, their lawyers and accountants are
already lining up to greet them with billable hours and timesheets.
The network of these players works such that the players feed
business to one another to the exclusion of smaller entrepreneurs,
except for those local "privileged few" who are selected or recom-
mended by the government, due to their close-knit connections
with government officials, a suspect link that may lead to the For-
tune 500's derivative liability under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt. Prac-
tices Act ("FCPA") (assuming that corporate "knowledge" of their
389 Enron's 10K Annual Reports filed for fiscal years 1997 and 1998 disclosed
that Enron was developing Phase II of the Dabhol power project, which consisted
of a 1,624MW combined-cycle power plant, together with the development of liq-
uefied natural gas ("LNG") station and harbor to supply fuel to Dabhol. ENRON
CORP., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 13-15 (1998), ENRON CORP., 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 13-15
(1999). Enron's 1OKs also disclosed that financing for the Phase II project would
commence in late 1999 (as per 1998 10K) or 2000 (as per 1999 10K), with commer-
cial operation for the facilities to commence in 2001. Id.; ENRON CORP., 1999
ANNUAL REPORT 8-10 (2000). Enron reported that earnings from Enron Whole-
sale's energy-related assets increased, reflecting the operation of the Dabhol
Power Plant in India. Id. However, in Enron's 10K Annual report for fiscal year
2000, the completion date for Dabhol Phase II was reportedly delayed to late 2001,
and the LNG component's completion date was further delayed to mid 2002.
ENRON CORP., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 8-10 (2001).
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local agents' bad acts can be established) 390
Following is a specific example of how this close-knit network
may work to the severe disadvantage of talents from the local
community, using the legal practice as an illustration. In Vietnam
(the investment environment for our 1994 Vietnam Deal), except
for a couple of small boutique international law firms with estab-
lished track records in the country prior to the Communist take-
over in 1975, small local law firms had no chance to compete with
MNCs' Service Providers. This was extremely ironic because the
task of advising MNCs involved the interpretation of esoteric Viet-
namese law (often appearing on yellow paper in manual type-
writer type), which often seemed alien to lawyers trained in devel-
oped jurisdictions. Yet in the early 1990s, the timeframe for our
Vietnam Deal, the international law and accounting firms, based
either in the United States or United Kingdom, dominated Viet-
nam's legal and business advisory scene. The excuse used by the
foreign investment community was that either local law did not ex-
ist, was not enforced, did not work for or apply to foreigners, or
that corporate clients had no comfort in using local lawyers due to
such lawyers' communist indoctrination and deficient knowledge
of the Anglo-American legal system or capital market. These
stereotypical assumptions were made, even though (i) the local tort
and criminal law of the host jurisdiction had little to do with any
Anglo-American legal system or capital market model,391 and (ii)
390 See Duong, supra note 295, n.187, n.189-91 (discussing the "knowing" ele-
ment under Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA")). Under the FCPA, local,
non-U.S. agents can also be prosecuted and can implicate the MNC and its em-
ployees, provided that the element of "knowledge" on the part of the MNC and
its employees is proven. This linkage is distinguishable from a scenario where the
MNC works with an agent of the host government. If the government requires
dealing with the host government's agent as an in-between contact, the MNC will
want to comply in order to gain support from the government. One such example
is the recent scandal involving the President of Kazakhstan. U.S. prosecutors filed
a criminal action against Kazakhstan's agent, a U.S. citizen, for FCPA violations.
Jeff Gerth, U.S. Businessman Is Accused of Oil Bribes to Kazakhstan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
1, 2003, at A10.
391 The assumption that the developing nation has no or little law is not al-
ways correct. In a lesser-developed and authoritarian country, law and order
purposely become ways for the ruling elites to "flex their muscles" and to exhibit
the oppressive regime's supreme authority to administer the "written law."
Leaders will use or formulate written laws to justify their actions ex post facto. For
example, in prosperous Singapore's model of "Asian-styled modified democ-
racy," written laws (interpreted by common law precedents) were enacted to re-
strict freedom of speech and access to information, and to impose government li-
censing upon private acts. See, e.g., Scott L. Goodroad, Comment, The Challenge of
Free Speech: Asian Values v. Unfettered Free Speech, an Analysis of Singapore and Ma-
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laysia in the New Global Order, 9 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 259, 270, 288-89 (1998)
(discussing, inter alia, Singapore's and Malaysia's Internal Securities Acts restrict-
ing freedom of speech, and the interpreting case of Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v.
Lee Kuan Yew, [19921 2 S.L.R. 310 (Sing.), available at 1992 SLR LEXIS 412).
The problem with the "rule of law" in many "Third World" nations is not
whether laws exist, or whether laws exist in abundance. For example, in Vietnam,
according to the private international bar, from the inception of Vietnam's "open
door" economic policy to 1994, Vietnam passed 120 "Laws" (enactments by the
National Assembly) and more than 1000 decrees, circulars, ordinances, and inter-
pretative decisions (constituting what U.S. legal scholars know as public law or
administrative law). See THE ECONOMIST CONFERENCES, OPERATING IN VIETNAM, A
MANAGEMENT FORUM 16 (1994) (Conclusions Paper of Conference in Ho Chi Minh
City, April 11-12, 1994 (statement by Nguyen Tan Hai, then Baker & McKenzie
Representative based in Hanoi)). Instead, the challenges are whether law is fairly
and equitably formed, whether law is enforced to effectively achieve both sub-
stantive and procedural due process, and whether the system of law is workable.
In general, in their "country report" style of providing advisory services, in-
ternational legal advisors to foreign investors in the developing nations tend to
focus on the countries' civil and commercial law systems (or lack thereof), as well
as these countries' memberships in the Multilateral and Bilateral Institutions,
rather than looking into the civil tort and criminal justice systems of the host
countries. This decision tends to reinforce Fortune 500 management and general
counsel's notion that what is important to them is a country's aspirations to invite
foreign commercial interests. Hence, the Fortune 500's focus is on the investment
climate and the country's foreign investment and natural resource laws. These
"commercial interest" types of law receive Fortune 500 General Counsels' priority
consideration, and are artificially segregated from the country's human rights and
civil liberty records, or the relationship between a government and its own citi-
zens.
For the following two reasons, I seriously question the soundness and wis-
dom of this segregation. In my view, the civil tort and criminal justice systems of
a host country should be the first thing the international counsel needs to look at,
and this task requires the full cooperation and utilization of the native legal, schol-
ars, regardless of differences in training or backgrounds.
First, criminal justice and civil tort systems, whether viewed as legally sim-
plistic or complex and sophisticated from the perspective of the U.S-trained law-
yer, would provide the most direct and most profound insight into a society and
its curve of development, as these foundational systems speak for human rela-
tions in society, the interaction between citizens and the State, and the role occu-
pied by the sovereign state in private lives.
Second, foreign investors and their employees do travel, live, work, and en-
gage in economic and commercial activities in the host nation. How can they then
ignore the civil tort and criminal justice systems that govern the general popula-
tion, unless there is an implicit understanding that the foreign investors are privi-
leged or supreme citizens who are above the law?
In summary, I think that the "country report" accompanying the foreign in-
vestor to a foreign land should begin with the country's constitutional and politi-
cal frameworks, as well as the country's civil tort and criminal justice systems.
These topics require and demand the intimate involvement of, and constant con-
sultation with, the native lawyers during the client advisory process, right from
the start of any FDI projects.
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both Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (the formerly capitalistic, entre-
preneurial Saigon, once fully exposed to America's legal system
and constitutional framework) were inundated with middle-aged
or senior citizen former lawyers well trained in French civil and
commercial law and/or Soviet legal principles, which, at that time,
made up the legal system of Vietnam. (Any capital market model,
in the heyday of Vietnam's economic development, was being
drafted by government cadres in consultation with Western law-
yers sent by the newly arrived investors, leaving the well-trained
civil law and Soviet law scholars of Vietnam as second-class citi-
zens performing interpreter and translator roles at a minuscule
fraction of the salary of an expatriate Western lawyer practicing in-
ternational business on Vietnam's soil. Those Western Interna-
tional Business Transaction ("IBT") lawyers worked in collabora-
tion with a privileged few "local counsels" who were often high-
ranking party members selected and recommended by the host
government.)
The foregoing esoteric example involving the private interna-
tional law practice typifies the close-knit alliance of multinational
corporate brand-names found in a "Third World" environment,
which disadvantages local talents. The same pattern of monop-
oly392 exists when brand-name corporate players are involved in
Project-Financed IPP Transactions -the formation of a self-feeding
network that dominates the natural gas and utility sector in the
"Third World." A couple of law school hypotheticals can help
demonstrate how the tendency to favor brand-name corporate
identities will inescapably and undoubtedly influence Project Fi-
nancing bankers' risk assessment process.
Hypothetical #1: Suppose that my students, Reid and Megan,
want to open a restaurant chain in the new Afghanistan. They
would like to have a Project-Financed loan from J.P. Morgan Chase
392 Cf. Jim Rossi, The Electric Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory Federal-
ism to Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision of Public Goods, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 1768 (2002) (reviewing CHARLES R. GEISST, MONOPOLIES IN AMERICA: EMPIRE
BUILDERS AND THEIR ENEMIES FROM JAY GOULD TO BILL GATES (2000) (tracing the
evolution of monopolies and their control in the United States), RICHARD F. HIRSH,
POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN
ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM (1999) (stating that deregulation of the utility industry
and resulting competition enabled investment banks to earn banking fees from
doing business with many new non-utility players, not just the regulated, brand-
name utility companies), and PAUL W. MAcAvoY, THE NATURAL GAS MARKET:
SIXTY YEARS OF REGULATION AND DEREGULATION (2000) (discussing how regulatory
efforts in natural gas have not contributed to consumer welfare nor produced
gains to producers or pipeline operators)).
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(which, at the time I finished writing this Article, was contemplat-
ing acquisition of Bank One).393 Having learned principles of Pro-
ject Financing, Reid and Megan have managed to secure several ca-
tering contracts from business offices in the new Afghanistan.
Under each contract, Reid & Megan LLC will provide hamburger
lunches to all U.S. expatriates craving American food, and those
native employees who want a "taste" of the American fast food
culture. Reid & Megan LLC will also handle banquets for all these
offices at every American holiday celebrated by U.S. expatriates in
Afghanistan. Under the terms of these catering contracts, for the
next five years, these businesses will pay for a minimum number
of meals all year round, regardless of whether or not those meals
are actually consumed by their employees-a "Take or Pay" con-
cept analogous to gas sales terms in the energy sector: a gas buyer
will pay for the supply, whether or not it actually takes delivery of
the gas.394 These "Take or Pay" terms are to secure and stabilize
long-term supplies of a scarce and unpredictable commodity in a
seller's market. These "Take or Pay" terms are possible because
Reid & Megan is the only supplier of hamburgers and American
food in Afghanistan. The income stream produced by these cater-
ing contracts is sufficient to pay for debt services for the next five
years.
Applying classic Project Financing principles, J.P. Morgan
Chase should have no problem financing the Reid & Megan LLC.
deal, judging solely on the economic viability of its restaurant and
catering project (as evidenced by well-secured, tightly drafted con-
tractual rights producing a steady future income stream for five
years). Nonetheless, J.P. Morgan Chase bankers may inescapably
be influenced by the two youthful and obscure project sponsors,
who have not demonstrated any experience in the food industry, in
international business, or in the country of Afghanistan. In classic
Project Financing, none of those factors should matter, since only
the income-producing certainty of the project should drive the risk
393 Bank MegaMerger Will Foster Another Mutual-find Heavyweight, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 15, 2004; Michael Mackenzie & David Feldheim, J.P.Morgan/Bank One Deal to
Create New Credit Card Giant, Jan. 14, 2004 (describing how J.P. Morgan Chase's
purchase of Bank One will produce a combined financial institution to rival mar-
ket leader Citigroup), available at http://global.factiva.com/en/arch/print-
results.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2005).
394 See, e.g., JOHN D. FINNERTY, PROJECT FINANCING ASSET-BASED FINANCIAL
ENGINEERING 59-60 (1996) (discussing "Take-Or-Pay Contract" as a type of pur-
chase-and-sale agreement concerning long-term supply of a scarce commodity in
great demand in a seller's market).
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assessment process. Nonetheless, there is a great chance that the
bank will still require Reid's and Megan's parents to guarantee the
debt, or an examination of at least two years' financials by Reid &
Megan LLC showing its prior income in the food service business,
which my two entrepreneurial students do not have. Reid &
Megan LLC has no "brand-name" appeal or corporate reputational
identity, which apparently Enron had with respect to its Dabhol
project, prior to its scandalous collapse. The classic principles of
Project Financing might have been applied full force and favorably
to Enron's Dabhol, but not to Reid & Megan LLC. J.P. Morgan
Chase may feel differently should the name Reid & Megan LLC be
replaced with McDonald's Corporation, even if the project and its
supporting catering contracts remain exactly the same. Although
corporate brand-name is undoubtedly a factor in any kind of busi-
ness judgment, here, in the context of Project Financing, it has di-
luted the very principle underlying the funding concept-it is the
project, not the project sponsor, that should provide the basis for
lending or collateralization.
Hypothetical No. 2: Assume further that Reid and Megan will be
able to pull together a group of petroleum engineers trained by the
prestigious School of Mines in Colorado. Together they will form a
company to participate in "Third World" natural gas and IPP in-
vestments via the procurement of finders' fees or technical consult-
ing contracts in exchange for a minimal equity interest of approxi-
mately 0.1%. Suppose that they were able to procure such an
interest in a contemplated pipeline construction in the new Iraq.
Again, my two students will go to J.P. Morgan Chase. The same
dubious concerns might still characterize the loan application
process because of Reid & Megan LLC's lack of "brand-name" ap-
peal and track record, even though under Project Financing princi-
ples, bankers should be looking at the project, and not the project
sponsors. Suppose further that Reid and Megan switched their
investment and substituted Iraq with the Republic of Chad. The
bankers might still be reluctant. Suppose, finally, that Reid and
Megan were to show the bankers contracts between their LLC and
ExxonMobil, guaranteeing Reid & Megan LLC's finder's fee in the
pipeline and oil production project currently underway in Chad,
which already received Multilateral Funding and was co-
sponsored by ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, and Shell.395 The
395 See Duong, supra note 295, at 1171, 1178 n.15 (discussing the Republic of
Chad).
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bankers might just change their view about Reid & Megan LLC's
Project Finance eligibility at that time, having been influenced by
(i) the "brand-name" appeal, credibility and glory of ExxonMobil
as a Fortune 500 entity, (ii) the mighty strength of the de facto "oil
cartel" behind the Chad project; and (iii) the added assurances of
Multilateral Financing already accorded to the overall project and
the host country.
I have taken the liberty of speculating on what J.P. Morgan
Chase bankers might have done with my two students and their
Limited Liability Company, only to illustrate my point: Project Fi-
nancing can operate as an exclusive privilege for corporate giants
and sponsors of large-scaled projects. To fully realize the goals of
free enterprise and to maximize the utility of Project Financing as a
stimulant for "Third World" economic development, the concept
must apply with rigor and fairness to the smaller entrepreneurs
who take a chance with a "Third World" investment environment.
The Multilateral Institutions, in their free-enterprise economic mis-
sion, should provide the fullest support to these small foreign or
native entrepreneurships. This can only be done if the Multilater-
als regard economic development projects and related infrastruc-
ture building in a broader and more flexible light. Without such
multilateral support and a breakthrough in real-world application
of Project Financing, very few small or medium-sized entrepre-
neurs can afford to compete against, for instance, the consortium of
ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell Group, BP-Amoco, and Chevron-
Texaco in poverty-stricken Chad. Nor could any entrepreneur-
ships formed by returning East Indian Americans have competed
successfully against mighty Enron in the mid-1990s in a project like
Dabhol, which was fully supported and made feasible by Project
Financing; yet eventually turned out to be a sour experience for In-
dia. Even when the smaller entrepreneurs could raise funds or
pull together their lifetime savings to pursue their "American
dream" in the "Third World," they would most likely become the
easy targets for bribery requests, or selective adverse material gov-
ernmental action ("MAGA"), since typically they had no "brand-
name" corporate clout to protect them. They might succeed if they
somehow could tap into an existing network of governmental con-
nections and benefits, which in all likelihood might carry grave
FCPA implications. The smaller, independent entrepreneurs tak-
ing a chance with the "Third World" would operate in the worst
risk scenarios.
In the experience of Vietnam, a good number of disappointed
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and bankrupt Vietnamese American entrepreneurs (or returning
Vietnamese expatriates from other developed nations such as
France or Canada) have become witness to the failed American
dream. For example, on May 15, 2003, the Wall Street Journal re-
ported the sad story of two young Vietnamese who returned to
their former home from their adopted home overseas in order to
successfully operate a telecommunications business after helping
Nokia and Samsung obtain an 80% share of the local market.396
(The popularity and high usage of cellular phones in the develop-
ing nations may surprise the American public, but the high usage
may also include volumes of international, long-distance, and
business calls made by the business and expatriate community.)
397
According to the Wall Street Journal, the brothers' newly formed
company allegedly surged to $40 million in sales in 2002, but their
success story did not last long.. The Vietnamese government re-
cently arrested both young entrepreneurs, accusing them of tax
evasion and confiscating their business and inventory -something
that it would probably not have done to a Fortune 500 executive
who might legitimately have been paid offshore for services ren-
dered in the country. Countless similar stories never made it to the
Wall Street Journal for the benefit of the observing public. They
became part of the continuing untold sad stories of exiled Viet-
namese after half a century of war and bloodshed that had sent
them away from their former home. Neither the allure of the
"American Dream" nor the ennobled economic development of
their root culture has saved these daring entrepreneurs from heart-
aches and bankruptcies.
In summary, the instigation of small business involvement in
"Third World" economic development must be a joint project for
the multilateral community, the private lending community, as
396 Barry Wain, Two Vietnamese Brothers Fall Victim to Their Success, WALL ST.
J., May 15, 2003, at A15. The news story also references the arrest of the Vietnam-
ese Australian owner of Peregrine Capital Vietnam in the 1990s.
In 2000, the Vietnamese government also sentenced a Vietnamese Canadian
woman to death, having convicted her of drug trafficking and holding her in cap-
tivity (together with her aging mother), notwithstanding the Canadian govern-
ment's plea for due process, procedural justice, and clemency. See Nguyen Nam
Phuong, Southeast Asia: Vietnam Debates Capital Punishment, Again, ONLINE ASIA
TIMEs, May 31, 2000, at http://wwwatimes.com/se-asia/BE31Ae02.htnl (last vis-
ited Feb. 22, 2005); Le Vietnam, Aujourd'hui: Vietnam Executes Canadian Trafficker,
AGENCE FRANCE PREss, Apr. 28, 2000. Both articles raise the question of whether
the Vietnamese-Canadian woman might have been innocent.
397 Rasul Bailay, Poorer Nations Lead Cellphone Growth, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21,
2004.
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well as governmental agencies of the home jurisdiction (entities
such as the Small Business Administration or various state authori-
ties and Chambers of Commerce in the United States). In the new
global age, new visions and new roles for the smaller or medium-
sized entrepreneurship must be born. In its purest form as an eco-
nomic development stimulant, Non-Recourse Project Financing,
after all, should not be just a benefit and risk-transfer mechanism
for conglomerates of the powerful and the rich.
4. REFLECTION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION: THE
ROAD TO TRAVEL
4.1. The Need for Reflection
I have by now unveiled before you certain transactional legal
issues that may contribute to the pattern of "Third World" eco-
nomic development projects in the petroleum and energy sector.
The lawyer plays a pivotal role in the forming of such a pattern.
This role deserves some reassessment.
The prospect of an equitable global economy was envisioned
half a century ago when the Bretton Woods Multilateral Institu-
tions were created in the aftermath of World War Two and the
global depression. The World Bank has since proclaimed, as its
motto, that it's "Dream is A World Free of Poverty."398 The new
millennium calls for an examination, empirically and conceptually,
of this mission's progress, not necessarily as a critique of the World
Bank, but rather, as a suggested focus for researchers of the global
economy. 399
Recent events have afforded the American public an opportu-
nity to reassess the role played by corporate America in foreign re-
lations and "Third World" economic development. I recall seeing
an interview of school children on national TV during the Septem-
ber 11 crisis. One schoolgirl asked the interviewer: "Why do those
people hate us so much?"
The program ended there without an answer.
I am not sure there can ever be a comfortable or exhaustive an-
398 See The World Bank Mission Statement, available at http://web.world
bank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20040565-menu
PK:34563-pagePK:51123644piPK:329829-theSitePK:29708,00.html (exploring the
goals, values, and principles of the World Bank) (last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
399 But see generally 50 YEARS IS ENOUGH: THE CASE AGAINST THE WORLD BANK
AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Kevin Danaher ed., 1994).
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swer to the child's question. On network television back then, in
the heart of the September 11 national wound and the peak of pa-
triotism, it was not the kind of question we wanted to face. But the
innocent question brought to our consciousness the perplexing
root causes of anti-American sentiments that fertilize extremists'
atrocious behaviors, in an era when, supposedly, all worlds should
become one. In searching for an answer to the child's question, it is
natural to focus our attention on U.S. foreign policies.400 What can
easily be overlooked is the role of that "Quiet American"401 who,
outside the political arena, has long contributed to the image of
Americans abroad.
Among these "Quiet Americans" are the corporate executive
and his/her corporate lawyer, both of whom jointly map global
development for profit. They travel to remote locations of distinc-
tive ancient cultures to strike deals.402 In the discrete ways that of-
ten characterize confidential economic negotiation, they become
"de facto ambassadors" of the American way of life and the show-
case of its influence abroad. Quite often, and acceptably so, cul-
tural sensitivity is overshadowed by economic goals. But it goes
without saying that in order to participate in the global economy, it
is no longer adequate for an international executive and his/her
lawyer just to surround themselves with their international "Ser-
vice Providers." Nor is it adequate for the pair to arm themselves
with a manual, "Doing Business in XYZ jurisdiction," or a nicely
compiled "country report" on a nation's foreign investment legal
framework and governmental structure, often curiously described
400 For a connection between the Bush Administration's Wilsonianism and
the emergence of cultural globalization in which the American way of life plays a
dominant factor, see CULTURAL MATTERS: How VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS
(Lawrence E. Harrison et al. eds., 2000), and Andrew J. Bacevich, Culture, Global-
ization, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 19 WORLD POL'Y J. 77-82 (2002) (reviewing MANY
GLOBALIZATIONS: CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (Peter L. Ber-
ger & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2002)).
401 Term taken from international author Graham Greene's famous political
novel. GRAHAM GREENE, THE QUIET AMERICAN (1955). Greene was credited with
predicting the pessimistic outcome of the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia-that
the "Quiet American" would die in Southeast Asia, symbolic of the U.S.'s loss in
the Vietnam War (1954-1975). See, e.g., James Carroll, The Age of Innocence, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 18, 2003, available at http://www.commondreams.org/views03/0 2 18 -
02.htm (analyzing the contemporary relevance of Graham Greene's "Quiet
American") (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
402 See Daphne Eviatar, Wildcat Lawyering, AM. LAW., Nov. 2002, at 81 (dis-
cussing the phenomenon of big-firm lawyers following the trail of oil and pipe-
lines, expanding their practices to deals made in remote countries and locations
such as Baku, Azerbaijan, and Turkey).
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in American legal jargon.
If this is not enough, what will be enough? The gravity of con-
temporary geopolitical issues and the complexity of today's world
necessitate a reorientation of perspectives and outlook.
403
4.2. Five Suggestions
I advocate the following five points, as part of what I consider
an overall, systematic "public interest" approach to international
deal-making.
4.2.1. Systematic Training on Multiculturalism for the
International Business Executive and Legal Practitioner,
and Rewriting the Agenda of MNC Corporate Counsel
Both the IBT executive and her lawyer should be trained on
multiculturalism, and made cognizant of their "de facto ambassa-
dor" role. This training should be similar to the training of foreign
service officers without the political overtone. 404 I think of the
traveling corporate executive and her lawyer specializing in "Third
World" projects as those who have taken the "road less traveled"
envisioned by Robert Frost.405 On such road less traveled, the trav-
eler encounters burdens as well as benefits. More exotic life oppor-
tunities present unconventional responsibilities. The "de facto am-
bassador" role goes with the job, regardless of choice, because our
world is getting extremely complex from all fronts, and all actors
have become interdependent.
Likewise, the agenda of corporate counsel should be reevalu-
ated and rewritten. It is no longer sufficient to devise minimal le-
gal compliance. The artificial division between non-economic hu-
man rights concerns and private economic law is already blurred
and should be alleviated, because, at the end of the day, for the
transnational corporation, both platforms can be translated into
403 See, e.g., Jeffrey K. Walker, Law and International Relations, 51 U. KAN. L.
REV. 297, 297, 301 (2003) ("The world did not change on September 11 ... [riather,
the United States suddenly noticed how the world actually is .... Although I re-
fuse to blame Americans and American culture for the atrocities of September
11th, we need to do a better job of reaching out in tolerance to other peoples.").
404 The global workforce of MNCs include executives and lawyers from all
cultures. As its ultimate objective, the training on multicultural sensitivity and
awareness of geopolitical issues should apply to the global workforce, and not just
U.S. professionals.
405 Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken (1916), reprinted in THE POETRY OF ROBERT
FROST 105 (Edward Connery Lathem ed., 1969).
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contingent or actual liabilities and monetary losses.
Many strata of the international community, see the aspirational
"rule of law," whether it be public or private international law, as
the rule that serves humanity. A "post-industrial sensibility"
throughout the developed countries is being called to the center
stage of policy-making, toward the search for some sort of a moral
consensus in a world of differences and in the aftermath of several
corporate scandals and tragic world events.4 6 Part of the challenge
is the articulation of a "corporate morality" attached to a legal fic-
tion such as the corporation. As an English jurist once declared,
"[c]orporations have neither bodies to be punished, nor souls to be
condemned. They therefore do as they like."407
But even if such moral consensus may be far from reality, un-
doubtedly and justifiably issues such as international human
rights, cultural property, and environmental issues should be part
of the corporate counsel's agenda, considering, inter alia, the recent
spur of class action lawsuits against U.S.-based corporations by
foreign workers, and recently renewed United Nations' human
rights initiatives.408 Specifically, companies in the extractive indus-
try have recently become the renewed target of scrutiny due to
406 Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. Gabaldon, If I Only Had a Heart: Or,
How Can We Identify a Corporate Morality, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1645 (2002); Beth
Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 2002
BERKLEY J. INT'L L. 45 (2001); William M. Sullivan, Morality in America, 12 THE
RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 79-82 (2002) (reviewing ALAN WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM:
THE IMPOSSIBLE IDEA THAT DEFINES THE WAY WE LIVE Now (2001)).
407 Edward, 1st Baron Thurlow, English Jurist (1731-1806), available at
http://www.saidwhat.co.uk/quotes/e/edward,_lst.baron thurlow_2392.php
(last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
408 Jenna Greene, Gathering Storm: Suits that Claim Overseas Abuse Are Putting
U.S. Executives on Alert and Their Lawyers on Call, LEGAL TIMES, July 21, 2003, at 1
(discussing foreign plaintiffs' suits against MNCs based on the Alien Tort Claims
Act: ExxonMobil was sued over the hiring of Indonesian solders as security
guards; Unocal was sued over the Burma pipeline; IBM was charged with supply-
ing computers that enabled the South African government to create devices to
control black population; Ford Motor Company, General Motors, and Daimler
Chrysler were named for providing armored vehicles to patrol townships; Citi-
group, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Credit Suisse were sued for providing funding to
South Africa to expand its police apparatus); see also Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights: Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 55th Sess.,
Agenda Item 4 at 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/links/norms-Aug2O3.html (last visited Feb.
22, 2005); accord Betsy Apple, Blood on Their Hands: Corporations, Militarization, and
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. STUD. 127 (2002).
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lawsuits brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act.40 9 It is incon-
gruent to have U.S. public interest lawyers and workers of Non-
Governmental Organizations ("NGOs") and International Non-
Governmental Organizations ("INGOs") running around a devel-
oping country advocating and monitoring human rights compli-
ance, while U.S. corporate executives are ignoring that aspect of re-
ality, and, instead, concentrating solely on negotiating, outwitting,
and partnering with the "monarch." A short-term profit focus or
the rush toward deal closings, without considering the real party-
in-interest-the inhabitants of the developing economies-is the
short-sighting of ultimate corporate goals and accountability. Cor-
porations are citizens of every market and community in which
they operate. In the United States, the same message has been
spoken through the doctrine of social responsibility, made applica-
ble to the corporation's role by state incorporation statutes as well
as by caselaw. 410 Similarly, aspirational international law also rec-
ognizes the doctrine of corporate social responsibility via the "so-
cial contract" theory - that the multinational corporation, by doing
business, enters into a "social contract" between it and the host so-
ciety. 4
11
409 Id; see also Duong, supra note 295, at 1202 n.69, 1269-70 n.239 (inventorying
lawsuits brought by foreign workers and inhabitants against MNCs).
410 See Duong, supra note 295, at 1191 n.37, 1253 n.197, 1257 n.208 (discussing
the doctrine of corporate social responsibility). The scholarly debate regarding
effective remedies for the implementation of the corporate social responsibility
doctrine is ongoing. See, e.g., Eric Engle, Corporate Social Responsibility: Market-
Based Remedies for International Human Rights Violations?, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
103 (2004).
411 See, e.g., U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, The Social Respon-
sibility of Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc TD/UNCTAD/ITE/IT/Misc. 21
(1999) [hereinafter UNCTAD] (UNCTAD "serves as the focal point within the
[U.N.] Secretariat for all matters related to foreign direct investment and transna-
tional corporations") (noting the complexity of determining transnational corpo-
rations' corporate responsibility); THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES
THAT BIND: A SOCIAL CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS (1999) (discussing
the application of social contracts theory to economic issues and extending the
theory to MNCs); Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a United Con-
ception of Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
252 (1994) (advancing the integrative social contracts theory that recognizes ethi-
cal obligations based on consent); Don Mayer, Community, Business Ethics, and
Global Capitalism, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 215 (2001) (endorsing the integrative social con-
tracts theory but cautioning that the large multinational corporation is rapidly
changing the traditional patterns of society and notions of community).
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4.2.2. Expanded Ethical Concepts Governing Lawyers to
Accommodate a Legal Transnational Practice
To date, the role of the international business transactional
(IBT) lawyer in "Third World" economic development remains at
best an elusive mystery. Her job involves an undecipherable, eso-
teric specialty in the eye of the international legal community. Two
reasons explain the myth about the IBT practice. First, the number
of truly full-time IBT lawyers is relatively small compared to the
legal community at large.412 Second, what they actually do can be
as imprecise and incomprehensibly exotic as the flexible nature of
the curriculum of IBT courses in accredited law schools, quite often
shaped by the individual view and previous work or research ex-
perience of the professor who teaches the course. The mystery is
not clarified by the generally vague and non-standardized public-
ity material of law firms that hold themselves out as having an "in-
ternational practice." 413 While the practice or teaching of torts, con-
tracts, or criminal law can definitively be contoured, IBT can be
anything that involves a cross-border touch or emphasis such as:
the highly structured administrative practice of international trade
concentrated in Washington, D.C.; the mammoth documentation of
bank financing performed at a lawyer's desk in New York City; the
"quickie" finalization of an international sale on a form invoice and
purchase order anywhere in the U.S.; the intensive, nerve-wrecking
negotiation of oil and gas interests in remote locations of the earth;
or simply the routine handling of a business immigration visa by a
small-town practitioner.
U.S. courts as well as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
recognized licensed practitioners as "officers of the court,"414 ow-
412 For example, as of 1996, out of the corporate in-house staff of Mobil Cor-
poration (now ExxonMobil), only twenty-five lawyers were classified as major
transactional lawyers responsible for the negotiation and implementation of deals
worldwide. This number did not include the headcount of lawyers assigned to
the daily servicing of producing subsidiaries or affiliates overseas.
413 For a look at international law firms' practice profiles, see Baker &
McKenzie, at http://www.bakernet.com/BakerNet/Practice/International+-+
Commercial/default.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
414 See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (referring to the lawyer's role as "advocate" and
"officer of the court"). U.S. courts have frequently spoken of lawyers as "officers
of the court" in various contexts, attributing this status to the attorney's sworn
oath to undertake the practice of law. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d
633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965) (stating that an attorney is an officer of the court); Jackson
v. State, 413 P.2d 488, 490 (Alaska 1966) (holding an attorney to be an officer of the
court assisting in the administration of justice). No court, bar, or code of ethics
has defined the term "officer of the court." See also Robert Bloomquist, The Phoe-
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ing responsibilities not only to clients, but also to the integrity of
the profession and the justice system symbolized by the bench and
the courthouse. The concept of lawyers as "officers of the court"
should have its counterpart in a transnational practice.415 The IBT
lawyer should be cloaked with the responsibility, not only to zeal-
ously advance the cause of her client, but also to make a contribu-
tion to the goals of harmonizing national laws, toward the building
of a "rule of law" system accepted by the "civilized nations."
416
nix Project: (Seriously) Renewing Public Trust in the American Justice System, 44 S.D.
L. REV. 41, 46 (1999) (advocating making legal professionals more like officers of
the court, quoting AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE: COMMUNITY AND
MORALITY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 158 (1996) (referring to lawyer's role as officer
of the court and as officers of "the community")); Ralph Nader, Corporate Law
Firms and the Perversion of Justice: What Public Interest Lawyers Can Do About It, 1
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 53, 60 (1999) ("Lawyers are the architects of justice in our
society.").
415 Although there is a gap in mandatory rules of conduct for transnational
practitioners, who are typically regulated by the licensing home jurisdiction, sev-
eral voluntary codes or guidelines have come into existence, thereby focusing the
attention of the international legal community on issues involving a transnational
practice. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF THE BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002) (setting
forth a code of professional conduct that has been adopted by eighteen nations);
SIR THOMAS LUND, THE INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION (IBA) INTERNATIONAL
CODE OF ETHICS (1970) (detailing rules of professional conduct collected from and
applicable to countries across the globe); NAFTA Model Rule on Legal Services
(Feb. 11, 1999); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000); Am.
Bar Ass'n (ABA), Report of the Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice, 2002
A.B.A. 50 (encouraging jurisdictions to "adopt the ABA model rule for the licens-
ing of legal consultants"); ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Model Rules of
Prof. Conduct, The American Bar Association's Evaluation of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct and MJP Issues; Texas-Mexico Bar Ass'n, The International Lawyer's
Creed; Union International des Avocats (UIA), Statement on Standards for Interna-
tional Legal Practice; cf. Detlev F. Vagts, Note, The International Legal Profession: A
Need for More Governance, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 250 (1996) (recognizing that national
legal systems almost always become watchdogs for international lawyers' con-
duct, and that issues of professional behavior for transnational lawyers are
plagued with problems and uncertainties).
For a comparative analysis of the international legal practice, see Peter Ro-
orda, The Internationalization of the Practice of Law, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141
(1993), and Lauren R. Frank, Ethical Responsibilities and the International Lawyer:
Mind the Gaps, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 957 (2000) (discussing developments in interna-
tional law and the internationalization of the legal profession).
416 FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 359, § 102.
With respect to ethical issues involving corporate counsel, see generally,
RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, No CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE
PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA xxiv-xv (1996) [hereinafter No CONTEST] (dis-
cussing corporate attorney ethical issues and the emerging role of corporations as
private legislatures); cf. George A. Riemer, Zealous Lawyers: Saints or Sinners, 59
ORE. ST. BAR BULL. 32, 32 (1998); Lawrence J. Fox, Lawyers' Ethics According to
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Whether or not IBT lawyers go to court, they should be made cog-
nizant of their role as "officers" or "members" of such an interna-
tional legal community working toward and sharing the "rule of
law" common to all civilized systems of national laws. The public
interest (concepts of ordre publique in civil law) 417 should not just be
used to defend national sovereignty. Ordre publique should under-
lie the continued development of the "internationalization" and
"legalization" trends, but only toward acceptance of a nucleus of
universal legal concepts constituting modern international law,
whether economic or humanitarian.
At the negotiation table, notwithstanding the IBT lawyer's role
as zealous advocate for her investor-client, she is, and should be in
the best position to strike the balance between private profit incen-
tives and the public interest. In the effective representation of her
client, she should also be mindful of the overall ethical duty to ad-
vance the public good. This "double hat" function is implicit in the
role of any lawyer, domestic or international. The notion, how-
ever, should eventually be expressed or incorporated explicitly in
modern Codes of Professional Responsibilities all around the na-
tion, as well as by the various voluntary bars, in order to accurately
reflect the realities of today's global economy.
4.2.3. Use of Voluntary Corporate Compliance Programs as a
Means to Police MNCs' Conduct, under a "Management-
Based/Enforced Self-Regulation" Model of Compliance
The enforceability of a "Universal Code of Multinational Cor-
porate Conduct" project has been talked about for years among
U.N. work groups as well as among institutions and legal acade-
mia.418 Still, the project has not become a reality. If we cannot
Nader: Let the Corporate Clients Beware, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 367, 372-73 (1999)
(reviewing and critiquing Nader's No CONTEST); Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation
by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 241-43 (1984)
("When my question-what does a business lawyer really do-is put to business
lawyers, the familiar response is that they 'protect' their clients, that they get their
clients the 'best' deal.").
417 See, e.g., Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations,
art. 16, 1980 O.J. (L 266) (incorporating concept of Ordre Publique in convention's
language).
418 The Global Compact is a voluntary corporate citizenship initiative seeking
to support ten labor, human rights, and environmental principles. See United Na-
tions, The Global Compact, at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Portal/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 22, 2005). Proposed by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and launched
at U.N. Headquarters in New York on July 26, 2000, the Global Compact is not a
regulatory instrument. It does not police, enforce, or measure corporate behav-
20051
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
come to an enforceable consensus on how to govern the conduct of
MNCs, then we must let them govern themselves, and oversee that
self-imposed process.
419
I suggest that the overseeing function start with the MNC's
home jurisdiction, and that a "management-based," "enforced self-
regulation," or "mandated self-regulation" model of compliance be
utilized as the legal framework to address this perplexing chal-
lenge.420 Such a "management-based" regulatory model, to be ad-
ministered by the MNC's home jurisdiction,421 should utilize the
MNC's voluntary "corporate compliance policies and programs"
(already in existence in most, if not all, U.S.-based publicly traded
companies) as the tool to achieve regulatory social goals.422 The
end result I hope for is the "double dosage" of public scrutiny so
that MNCs will impose upon themselves a "public interest" ap-
iors. See also The CERES Coalition, The Ceres Principles (listing principles endorsed
by nineteen U.S.-based publicly traded companies and directed by U.S.-based in-
stitutional investors, public interest groups, and environmental organizations), at
http://www.ceres.org/our-work/principles.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2005);
UNCTAD, supra note 411; U.N. Working Group on the Working Methods of
Transnational Corporations, Draft Commentary on the Norms of Responsibility of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Hu-
man Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/XX, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/
WG.2/WP.1 (2003); Jamie Cassels, Outlaws: Multinational Corporations and Catas-
trophic Law, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 311 (2001) (discussing the Union Carbide catastrophe
in Bhopal, India and specifically pointing out that both international law and vol-
untary codes of conduct are generally unenforceable).
419 Ans Kolk, et al., International Codes of Conduct and Corporate Social Responsi-
bility: Can Transnational Corporations Regulate Themselves?, 8 TRANSNAT'L CORP. 143,
175 (1999); KATHRYN GORDON, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, THE OECD GUIDELINES AND OTHER CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
INSTRUMENTS: A COMPARISON (Working Papers, 2001), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/36/2075173.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2005);
Codes of Conduct -Exploring Their Economic Significance (OECD May 11, 2001),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/15/2681579.pdf (last visited Feb.
22, 2005).
420 Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 691, 694-96 (2003)
(citing IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992), John Braithwaite, Enforce Self-Regulation: A New
Strategy for Corporate Crime Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466 (1982), Cary Coglianese
& Jennifer Nash, Environmental Management Systems and the New Policy Agenda, in
REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS? (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001)).
421 Compare Elisa Westfield, Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enter-
prise Responsibility: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. J. INT'L L.
1075 (2002) (advocating a cooperative approach between MNCs and their head-
quarters' governments).
422 I will save the precise or detailed construct of the model for another day.
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proach to international deal-making. (My hope is built, first, on
the common-sense philosophy that the human desire to "look
good" before a scrutinizing audience is just as strong as the human
desire to become powerful and rich; and, second, on the more so-
phisticated philosophy underlying U.S. corporate securities "dis-
closure" law - that full and accurate "disclosure" results in the best
balancing of market forces toward the corporation's self-correction
of inefficiencies and defects.)423
The "management-based" or "enforced self-regulation" model
has been presented and debated in both management and legal
academic literatures, in connection with different issues such as
environmental or product safety concerns. Also called "mandated
self-regulation," the model allows regulators to intervene at man-
agement's planning stage (rather than at the output stage). The
model aims to achieve regulatory social goals by allowing man-
agement to exercise its creativity in performing a "self-critical
analysis and evaluation" of the organization's internal programs.
424
Whether regulators will approve, ratify, or review management
plans, or otherwise require subsequent auditors' certification of
compliance will distinguish a "management-based" approach from
a traditional "information disclosure" approach, although both
models seek to provide greater availability of information to a con-
cerned public.
The "management-based" approach places the responsibility
for decision-making and program design with respect to legal
compliance with those within an organization who possess the
most information on risks and the control of risks. This model can
be less costly and more effective than traditional government-
imposed standards, and can improve employee morale and coop-
423 For a detailed explanation of federal and state implementation of the dis-
closure philosophy, see J. ROBERT BROWN, JR., THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE § 2.01, at 2-3 (3d ed. 1998).
424 The notion of "self-critical analysis" has been implemented in the securi-
ties industry's self-compliance programs in order to help the securities broker-
dealer firms satisfy their legal duty to supervise and police their own staff. Bro-
ker-dealers' self-compliance programs serve regulatory preventive purposes, cre-
ate effective compliance means by placing compliance functions within the firm's
normal operations, accommodate the particular needs and circumstances of the
firm, incorporate businessmen and women's creativity by cloaking them with
regulatory power, and hence constitute a better means to monitor and achieve
compliance goals. See, e.g., John H. Walsh, Right the First Time: Regulation, Quality,
and Preventive Compliance in the Securities Industry, 1997 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 165
(1997) (describing regulatory regimes for preventive compliance, supervision, and
quality).
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eration, since workers will tend to look at their own organization's
rules as being more "reasonable" than onerous government-
imposed rules.425 The model also helps mitigate problems associ-
ated with limited government resources and creates incentives for
firms to seek innovative solutions.
426
The term "management-based" distinguishes the model from
specific government regulations directed at firms' output perform-
ances. In its most flexible form, "management-based" regulation
need not be regulation at all, but rather serves as a voluntary op-
tion for firms. Market forces will cause firms to voluntarily devise,
create, and comply. Because the model shifts the focus of policy-
making from governments to private parties, it should be viewed
as a regulating strategy, rather than a body of statutory or regula-
tory criteria. This type of strategic governmental intervention is of-
ten needed to address some of more intractable public policy con-
cerns, for which governments have not been able to design
uniform standards.
The downside of the model lies in the fact that it does not nec-
essarily guarantee optimal results- firms may just go through the
motions or "game," or simply consider the new law an additional
nuisance, turning the "regulator" into a business "risk."427 The in-
herently adversarial nature of the relationship between businesses
and their government in the U.S. has prompted a small number of
authors to suggest an alternative "cooperative approach" to the in-
teraction between the regulator and the regulated -a model more
typically observed in Europe and Japan. These authors urge poli-
cymakers and the academy to utilize a comparative method to the
study of regulatory models across borders, although the jury is still
out concerning the efficacy. of cooperative methods of legal en-
forcement. 428 Other authors have urged, overall, a "consultative
425 Coglianese & Lazer, supra 420, at 694-95 (2003).
426 Id. at 696.
427 In the most recent global survey of some 1,394 CEOs during the fourth
quarter of 2003, "over-regulation" was rated as the number one risk by CEOs (the
biggest threat to their business). Global terrorism was rated as the fifth risk factor.
Marc Champion, CEO's Worst Nightmares: An Old Bogeyman Replaces Terrorists
Atop the List: Regulators, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2004, at A6.
428 REGULATORY ENCOUNTERS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN
ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM (Robert A. Kagan & Lee Axelrad eds., 2000), reviewed by
Sidney A. Shapiro, 50 AM. J. Comp. L. 229 (2002). See also Sanford M. Jacoby, Cor-
porate Governance in Comparative Perspective: Prospects for Convergence, 22 CoMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 5 (2000) (comparing models of corporate governance between
the U.S., Japan, and Western Europe in order to assess trends of convergence). It
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and cooperative" preferred approach to the development and im-
plementation of international standards for the global community,
as part of the "legalization" movement.
429
An effective "management-based" model will depend on the
types of mandates regulators choose for various purposes, as well
as the extent of government involvement or oversight included in
the model. Such mandates must aim to create incentives for a "co-
operative" model of enforcement that improves the regulated en-
tity's public image, client base, and business goodwill, rather than
the traditional adversarialism in which businesses view regulators
as "nuisances," "risks," or "threats" to their existence, or simply an
impediment to their thriving economic growth. To be effective, the
mandates chosen must be aimed at the areas of overlap between
firms' private interests and the public interest, in order to maxi-
mize the model's benefit.
One such area of overlap can be inferred from the fact that U.S.-
based MNCs have long voluntarily devised corporate compliance
policies and programs to curtail and police employee conducts, as
well as to ensure compliance with existing U.S. laws and foreign
laws where MNCs do business.430 (The same self-compliance trend
and practice have long been established in the broker-dealer secu-
rities industry.)431 These policies and programs are part of MNCs'
legal defenses in litigation or in the event a government investiga-
tion is initiated. When legal liability is found, these policies and
programs can be taken into consideration by the judicial officer
should be noted, however, that the strong U.S. economy in sharp contrast to the
more mediocre Japanese and European economies in the last decade may tend to
imply the superiority of the U.S. model, if efficiency and wealth optimization are
the standards for evaluating governance models. Overall, more concise studies
and better empirical data are needed to render meaningful conclusions to the
comparative analysis. Id. at 25-32.
429 See, e.g., Herbert V. Morais, The Quest for International Standards: Global
Governance vs. Sovereignty, 50 U. KANS. L. REv. 779, 815 (2002) (discussing how
sovereign nations should not be concerned with the rapid trend in the develop-
ment of international standards as a threat to their national sovereignty); see also
Elisa Westfield, Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enterprise Responsibil-
ity: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1075 (2002) (ad-
vocating a cooperative approach between MNCs and their home government).
430 See UNCTAD, supra note 411 (discussing Shell/Royal Dutch Group's and
Mattel, Inc.'s self-imposed codes of conduct); see also 2000 Chevron Texaco's Corpo-
rate Responsibility Report: Integrity and Learning in an Evolving World, at
http:/ / www.chevrontexaco.com/ cr-report/ 2002/ docs/complete-report.pdf and
http://www.chevrontexaco.com/cr-report/2002/docs/social-issues.pdf (last
visited Feb. 22, 2005).
431 Walsh, supra note 424, at 168.
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under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
432
Continuous -emphasis on compliance training has already
dominated the lives of international business executives and their
lawyers, mainly because of the complex regulatory framework of
U.S. laws with extraterritorial effect, among which are the Depart-
ment of Commerce's export control; the Department of Treasury's
foreign asset control; the Department of State's munition control;
and the joint effort of the Department of Justice and the Securities
& Exchange Commission over foreign corrupt practices. 433 This
emphasis has been evidenced by the wide range of corporate com-
pliance programs in place in today's MNCs' internal regulations,
434
as well as by the myriad of widely advertised continuing education
programs organized by the American Practicing Law Institute
("PLI").435
In the marketplace, these voluntary corporate compliance poli-
cies and programs have either stated the "bare-bone" minimum
expectations, or they have voluntarily included all aspirations for a
higher and more detailed level of legal compliance and ethics. Or,
quite often, publicly traded corporations have fluctuated their writ-
ten policy statements and programs on a spectrum between the
two extremes. I suggest the enactment of a new law in the home
jurisdiction, requiring publicly traded corporations to devise and
disclose corporate compliance programs designed specifically for
432 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 Commentary 3(k) (2003);
DON ZARIN, DOING BusINEss UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACrIcES Acr § 10-2
(1999).
433 See, e.g., Michael Deal, Tactical and Practical Considerations in Defending Ex-
port Control Enforcement Actions, 15 INT'L Q. 163, 163-88 (2003); Peter L. Fitzgerald,
Hidden Dangers in the E-Commerce Data Mine: Governmental Customer and Trading
Partner Screening Requirements, 35 THE INT'L LAW. 47, 47-70 (2001) (identifying all
governmental regulations and control applicable to export shipments and out-
bound international business transactions); see also Duong, supra note 295, at 1205-
06 n.75-79, 1245 n.164 (identifying U.S. laws with extraterritorial effect and vari-
ous types of governmental control exercised over international business transac-
tions as a result of U.S. economic sanctions taken against foreign nations).
434 For example, see General Electric's compliance program, Operating Sys-
tems, at http://www.ge.com/en/commitment/ehs/compliance/ehs-compliance
.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2005). Enron's Code of Ethics and Corporate Compli-
ance Policy are now available on-line following the 2001 scandal, illustrating the
lip service exhibited by certain members of Enron management, Enron Code of Eth-
ics, at http://www.thesmokinggun.com/ graphics/packageart/enron/enron.pdf
(last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
435 For various Practicing Law Institute courses on corporate compliance for
international businesses, see Practicing Law Institute, Highlights, at http:// www.
pli.edu (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
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their investments and economic conduct overseas. The contents of
these programs, however, are completely voluntary. These inter-
national business corporate compliance programs will be required
by the new law to be reported and filed with an overseeing non-
partisan Commission appointed by the President, serving a set
term.436 These voluntary programs will serve as the self-imposed
standards for U.S.-based MNCs. The public will be able to scruti-
nize these self-imposed programs, which will subject the MNCs to
constant scrutiny and pressure by the poll of community opinion.
This disclosure law serves to increase the level of public exposure,
awareness, and idea-stimulating debates.
In other words, MNCs are given a free hand to set their own
standards. Once the standards are set, MNCs will be motivated to
implement them via measurable programs, since all such self-
imposed programs will be required by law to be disclosed to the
public. The ensuing public debate will lead to effective self-
regulation. Since MNCs are already competing against one an-
other for favorable public opinion, under this model, industries
will eventually come up with their own universal code of conduct.
It is a "race to the top."
The proposal that the SEC should impose upon U.S.-based
MNCs social accounting and social audit obligations and disclo-
sures, at least with respect to environmental and civil rights issues,
has already been injected into academic discourse and legal advo-
cacy since the 1970s.437 Likewise, the concept of corporations' self-
436 The concept of an ad hoc governmental committee or work group --
formed to review or scrutinize corporate data for a specific purpose and as part of
a voluntary "notification" process initiated by the companies -is already present
in U.S. law. For example, under the Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense Pro-
duction Act of 1950 (enacted as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425 (codified as § 721 of
the Defense Production Act of 1950 at 50 U.S.C. § 2170 (1996)), the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States ("CFIUS") is an ad hoc governmental body
acting as delegate of the President to review incoming foreign investment and
protect the United States' national security interests. See id.
The issue of whether in my recommendation, a new government body should
be created, or whether the SEC should undertake the oversight function, is re-
served for another day.
437 Douglas M. Branson, Progress in the Art of Social Accounting and Other Ar-
guments for Disclosure on Corporate Social Responsibility, 29 VAND. L. REV. 539, 580-
627 (1976); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corpo-
rate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1273-99 (1999). Advocates went to
court to urge corporate disclosure requirements on environmental and civil rights
compliance, but the SEC prevailed in resisting such efforts. Douglas M. Branson,
Corporate Social Responsibility Redux, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1220-21 (2001-02).
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governance and voluntary compliance with social goals has more
recently been brought to the attention of policymakers. The Clin-
ton Administration issued the Model Business Principles in 1994,
although the Principles did not provide for implementation or en-
forcement, and in 1997, the Clinton Administration approved the
apparel industry's Workplace Code of Conduct, which reflected an
agreement between the industry and various human rights
groups.438 In 1997, two legislative proposals were introduced to
U.S. lawmakers toward the goal of establishing voluntary codes of
conduct for corporations, although neither was enacted into law.
The notable trend, as pointed out by a commentator, has been to
encourage proactive self-regulated solutions volunteered by MNCs
as an effort to correct or enhance their public corporate image, at
least in the consumer goods and manufacturing sector and in the
community of governmental contractors. 439 The public benefit of
encouraging corporations' voluntary disclosure and self-
compliance programs with respect to anti-discrimination laws has
also been suggested by commentators for public debate.440
In whatever form the final regulatory model may take, volun-
tary corporate compliance programs must extend beyond minimal
compliance with a set of U.S. laws having mandatory extraterrito-
rial effect. In this regard, the regulator may want to impose more
specific guidelines. Specifically, the program should include de-
tailed mandatory training for key expatriate and international
business personnel on international relations, multiculturalism,
cultural sensitivity, and geopolitical awareness, as I have sug-
gested above.441  These compliance programs may also include
438 Westfield, supra note 429, at 1097 (citing U.S. State Department, Promoting
the Model Business Principles, available at http://www.state.gov/www/about
state/business/business_#principles.html&gt); Bob Herbert, A Good Start, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 1997, at A17; Tim Shorrock, Workplace Agreement Gets Mhite House
Nod, J. COM., Apr. 15, 1997, at 5A.
439 Corporate Code of Conduct Act, H.R. 2782, 107th Cong. (2001) (previously
introduced in June 2000 as the Corporate Code of Conduct Act, H.R. 4596, 106th
Cong. (2000)); Good Corporate Citizenship and Federal Procurement Incentives
Act, H.R. 2071, 105th Cong. (1997); Westfield, supra note 438, at 1098-1101.
440 See, e.g., Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between
the Directorial Duty of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. Prrr. L. REV. 389 (2002)
(detailing how threats of shareholder derivative suits may encourage corporate
executives to self-regulate with respect to race discrimination in employment).
441- Cf. David Kahane, Dispute Resolution and the Politics of Cultural Generaliza-
tion, 19 NEGOTIATION J. 5 (2003) (advocating the use of multicultural contexts in
devising deliberative processes for dispute resolution and negotiation, even if
generalizations about cultural identities and values must be utilized for lack of a
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what the MNC views as its goals and responsibilities, as well as its
implementation of self-imposed guidelines governing the MNC's
international workforce, foreign asset base, and investment strate-
gies. The disclosure must be made under the "Plain English" rule,
a principle already incorporated into the SEC's disclosure require-
ments and guidance.442 As Professor Jacqueline Lang Weaver has
lamented, "the key to preventing Enron-type scandals is disclo-
sure .... [but] [w]hat good is disclosure of something that almost
no one can understand?" 43
In summary, socially responsible citizenship in the world
community by corporate America has an important role to play in
the global economy. Short of an accepted universal Code of Con-
duct, the regulatory model to be used for governing MNCs should
start with the home jurisdiction, modeled after the "enforced self-
regulation" approach I discussed above. The model will turn the
burden of being regulated into an opportunity for corporate Amer-
ica to showcase its social responsibility through voluntary compli-
ance.4
Ultimately, the self-regulation model must be elevated to a
global level as part of the "legalization" or "internationalization"
movement, and hence should not remain solely with the home ju-
risdiction. In other words, similar self-regulation models should
be implemented in the Northern Hemisphere (where most MNCs
were formed or headquartered), among the developed nations
sharing the same policy concerns. Otherwise, anomalous inequity
will exist among MNCs. For example, U.S.-based MNCs will be
burdened with the cost of funding and implementing the self-
regulation model, whereas other MNCs may be able to escape
such financial burdens simply because their home jurisdictions
have not endorsed the same or similar model of compliance. This
inequity will result in the loss of competitive advantage for U.S.-
based companies, causing them to be demoralized, and rendering
the self-regulatory model ineffective.
better alternative).
442 See Plain English Disclosure, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7497, 34-39593,
17 C.F.R. § 228-30, 239, 274 (Oct. 1, 1998).
443 Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted? The Effect of The
Rise and Fall of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 HOUSTON Bus. & TAx L.J. 1, 147 (2004).
444 Cf. Morais, supra note 429, at 816-17 (2002) (advocating shifting part of the
burden of enforcing standards to the marketplace that has more effective incen-
tives for compliance and performance).
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4.2.4. Integration of Certain Prophylactic Principles of Law into
International Deal-Making and the "Legalization"
Movement
The analysis of transactional patterns portrayed in this "twin
series" of articles lends itself to certain legal concepts that can dras-
tically change the landscape of current legal and business norms.
However, time and space constraints do not permit me to explore
these legal solutions here in depth. I will, however, summarize my
suggested legal solutions here, as a starter for further discussion
elsewhere or on another day.
Consistent with the "source" doctrine in international law,
445
certain general principles of law common to "civilized nations"
should be incorporated into modem transnational economic law.
Specifically, to help safeguard against the potential ills explored in
this "twin series" of articles, the following three legal concepts
should govern certain types of business partnership between
"Third World" governments and the private sector.
4.2.4.1 The "Public Trust" Theory and Government as the
People's Agent
Property collectively belonging to the people is held in a "pub-
lic trust" administered by the sovereign state.446 In industries
where the state claims resource ownership for the "people," the
government holds the "people's" property in "trust," resulting in
the creation of certain loyalty, care, and good-faith duties implicit
in the role of governments as the "people's" representatives. 447
445 See FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 359, § 102 (identifying the
sources of international law).
446 See, e.g., Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294
A.2d 47, 51 (N.J. 1972) (stating that certain land "belonged to the sovereign, but
for the common use of all the people ...."). The genesis of this principle is found
in Roman jurisprudence, which held that "by the law of nature ... the air, running
water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea .... [were] common to all
men." THOMAS COLLETT SANDARS, INSTITUTES JUSTINIAN 158 (Thomas C. Sandars
trans., 1st Am. ed. 1876). The notion that natural resources located beyond a na-
tion-state's continental shelf and exclusive economic zone belong collectively to
humankind is also the tenet underlying the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261.
447 In the context of property belonging to Indian tribes and other "'aborigi-
nes of America,'" U.S. courts have regarded the government as a trustee owing
fiduciary duties to the people, measured by the same strict standards applicable to
private trustees. See Ahuna v. Home Lands, 640 P.2d 1161, 1168-69 (Haw. 1982)
(recognizing Hawaiians as beneficiaries of trust; government as trustee, stating
that "the trust obligations of [government] toward beneficiaries ... may be deter-
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Whether acting in a sovereign or commercial capacity, a "Third
World" government or its negotiating instrumentality is simply an
agent of the people. 4 8 Governments must, therefore, discharge
their fiduciary duties in the execution and performance of contracts
governing the disposition, use, and exploitation of "the people's"
property. 449
4.2.4.2. The "Corporate Derivative Fiduciary Duty" Theory
As contractors of governments acting as agents for the "peo-
ple," MNCs must derivatively exercise duties of care, good faith,
and loyalty owed to the "people," and must discharge those duties
mined by examining well-settled principles enunciated by the federal courts re-
garding lands set aside by Congress in trust for the benefit of other native Ameri-
cans, i.e., American Indians, Eskimos, and Alaska natives."); see also Seminole Na-
tion v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) ("Under a humane and self-
imposed policy . . . in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions of this
Court, [the government] has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest
responsibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who repre-
sent it in dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by the most exact-
ing fiduciary standards."); United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973) (ob-
serving that the United States has a fiduciary duty as trustee for the Osage
Indians).
448 See generally John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents:
An Overview, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BusINEss 1 (John W.
Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1991) (stating that the agency relationship is
equally well established in the sphere of governments with the principals being
the citizenry). For stronger advocacy of government's fiduciary duties derived
from the agent-principal relationship, independent from the archaic "public trust"
doctrine, see Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29
CAL. W. L. REV. 239, 265-66 (1992):
Government officials are, in an economic and legal sense, agents. The
principals of government agents are the people .... [T]he insufficient in-
centive of government agents to protect collective rights in property...
suggests the merit of a procedural remedy that allows or even encour-
ages private persons to assert collective rights. We might view this as
something analogous to a shareholder's derivative suit in which the in-
dividual shareholder brings suit on behalf of and for the benefit of the
corporation. I emphasize that this problem, to the extent that there is
one, calls for a procedural, rather than a substantive remedy. It merely
confuses the matter to call this remedy an exercise of so parochial a thing
as the public trust doctrine ....
Id.
449 For a representative commentary on the origin of the "public trust" doc-
trine, see Cohen, supra note 448, at 249 ("The public trust doctrine comes to us
from English common law that was at least tangentially related to earlier Roman
law."). For an articulation of the modem public trust doctrine applicable in an
environmental protection context, see JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE
ENvIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CIZEN ACTION 163 (1971).
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in the performance of their investment contracts with govern-
ments, whether or not such duties are expressly embodied or de-
lineated in contractual language. 4 0 In this sense, corporate entities
who contract with governments to take over essential governmen-
tal functions act as "sub-agents" of the "people." 451 Standards of
conduct for certain types of FDI contractors who execute their con-
tracts with governments acting as "agents" of the "people" should
be construed in light of this "derivative fiduciary duty" overlay.
4.2.4.3. The "Third Party Beneficiary" Theory
Correspondingly, where the government holds property in
"trust" for the people, there exists in every contractual agreement
between MNCs and host governments a silent and innumerable
group of parties in interest: the "people" as third-party beneficiar-
ies of all such investment contracts. 452 As the natural consequence
of theories such as the "Public Trust," "Government as People's
Agent," or "Corporate Derivative Fiduciary Duty of MNCs as gov-
ernments' sub-agents" described above, both the MNC's share-
holder public45 3 and the people of the "Third World" should be re-
450 The U.S. Supreme Court has confirmed that government contractors can,
under limited circumstances, enjoy the type of sovereign immunity often derived
from, or attached to, the government's status. See, e.g., Brown v. Gen. Serv.
Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 826 (1976); see also Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys.,
Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (applying the government contractor de-
fense to preclude contractor liability when judgment would expend itself upon
public treasury). The following question should be raised: if a civilized, devel-
oped jurisdiction such as the United States has derivatively extended the benefit
of the government's status, to a private contractor, why can't the fiduciary duties
imposed upon the government be similarly extended to the same private contrac-
tor acting on the government's behalf?
451 In Rwanda v. Rwanda Working Group, 227 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2002),
the federal district court recognized that a person who contracts with a foreign
government for the performance of services may have agreed to act as the gov-
ernment's agent, and hence, will owe the foreign nation a fiduciary duty and a
duty of loyalty, as judged under U.S. domestic law.
452 See JOSHUA KARLINER, THE CORPORATE PLANET: ECOLOGY AND POLITICS IN
THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1997) (describing how grassroots globalization will
aid true corporate accountability to the people); cf. McAdams, supra note 361, at
249 (stating that globalization strives for the riches of the global market, while
leaving the "people invisible").
453 The notion that shareholders may directly or indirectly benefit or be in-
jured by corporate management's actions is firmly established in U.S. corporate
law via the procedures of either derivative suits or direct class actions. Palmer v.
U.S. Sav. Bank of Am., 553 A.2d 781 (N.H. 1989); Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034
(N.Y. 1996); FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)-(b), 23.1. However, only in very narrow circum-
stances have U.S. courts recognized a shareholder's right to sue as third-party
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garded as "third-party beneficiaries" of MNCs' partnerships with
governments. The interests of these two groups of "third-party
beneficiaries" (quite often standing an ocean apart) may conceptu-
ally conflict, but ultimately can be brought together to a meeting
point of consensus. The negotiation process, in which the IBT law-
yer plays a pivotal role, can become the bridge upon which com-
promises are reached and mutual economic goals achieved, but
this must be done with the "people's" interest in mind.
These legal concepts are nothing new. They have inherently
been acknowledged in existing business and legal norms under na-
tional laws, although their full impact has not been made manda-
tory or formally proclaimed to be for the benefit of "Third World
people." For example, FDI contracts in the petroleum and energy
sector already recognize the role of the host government as sover-
eign power granting foreign investors access to natural resources,
land, and surface use, which is owned or controlled by the state on
behalf of the "people." . In fact, these concepts exist in U.S. juris-
prudence and do not have to be recognized as part of customary
international law 454 in order for them to be enforceable against
U.S.-based MNCs with respect to their conduct abroad. The
United States as a sovereignty has always proclaimed that its "ju-
risdiction to prescribe"455 has valid extraterritorial effect, which en-
ables it to curtail the conduct of its nationals and citizens abroad.
This extraterritorial effect as an extension of U.S. sovereign power
has provided the basis for several bodies of important U.S. laws
and regulations, with very. harsh and far-reaching sanctions and
impact, both for the protection as well as for the curtailing of U.S.
nationals' economic behavior overseas. Examples of these "ET ef-
beneficiary of a contract between the corporate entity and a third party. Glass v.
U.S., 258 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that a shareholder had third-party
beneficiary status only if contract expressed promissor's intent to benefit share-
holder personally, independent of shareholder status).
454 Custom is a source of international law that is created through the practice
and opinion (opinio juris sive necessitatis) of states and by behavior by a state when
it acts out of a sense of legal obligation. FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra
note 359, § 102(2); REBECCA M. M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 9, 15 (2d ed.
1992);.
455 DETLEV F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL BusINEss PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1998); see also
David J. Gerber, Prescriptive Authority: Global Markets as a Challenge to Na-
tional Regulatory Systems (June 1-3, 2003) (unpublished paper, on file with the
Association of American Law Schools and the European Law Faculties Associa-
tion) (exploring national prescriptive jurisdiction over economic conduct of citi-
zens).
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fect" laws include federal income tax law, 456 export control law, 457
federal anti-trust laws, 45 8 the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA),459 economic sanctions law,460 certain aspects of U.S. anti-
discrimination in employment laws, 461 the Carriage of Goods at
High Sea Act (COGSA),462 the Federal Bill of Ladings Act
(FBLA),463 and most recently, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.464
Further, these legal principles do have support in existing in-
ternational law, and customary international law is part of the law
of the United States. The traditional concept of "statehood" in in-
ternational law implies the integration of three elements: (1) the
"people"; (2) their territory; and (3) their representative govern-
ment. If one of these three integral elements is missing, there is no
456 See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 999 (1978).
457 Export Administration Act, 50 App. U.S.C. § 2401 et seq. (2000) (continued
by Executive Order 13222, Aug. 17, 2001). The act is implemented by regulations
administered by the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA). 15 C.F.R. pts. 742,
744, 724, §§ 736.2, 742.8-10, 734.4, 740.3(d), 736.2, and 770.3 (Supp. 2001); see also
Export Administration Regulations: Simplification of Export Administration
Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 12714 (Mar. 25, 1996). For a non-U.S. view, see Tom
Harris, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Export Controls: A British Perspective,
19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 959 (1987).
458 See, e.g., Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations
(U.S. Dept. of Justice and Federal Trade Comm. April 5, 1996); John H. Chung,
Comment, The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 and the
Maelstrom Surrounding the Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Act, 69 TEMP. L.
REv. 371, 393 (1996).
459 15 U.S.C. §§ 578m, 78dd-1-3,78ff (2000).
460 U.S. economic sanctions are imposed against the following countries: (1)
Iran, see Iranian Asset Control Regulations 31 C.F.R. pt. 535 (2004), Iranian Tran-
sactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 (2004); (2) Burma, see Burmese Sanctions
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 537 (2004); (3) Sudan, see Sudanese Sanctions Regula-
tions, 31 C.F.R. pt. 538 (2004); (4) Lybia, see Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31
C.F.R. pt. 550 (2004). See also Restrictive Trade Practices or Boycotts, 15 C.F.R. §
760.1 (2004); Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 595 (2004); Terrorism
List Governments Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 596 (2004). Other controls
under the administration of the Department of State include the jurisdiction of the
Office of Defense Trade Controls, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2004), the International Traffic
in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 120 (2004) and the U.S. Munitions List, 22 C.F.R.
pt. 121 (2004).
461 See, e.g., William Carmell, Application of U.S. Anti-discrimination Laws to
Multinational Employers, 15 INT'L Q. 289-329 (2003) and all statutory provisions,
regulatory provisions, and case law cited therein.
462 The Carriage of Goods at Sea Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1300 (1994).
463 The Federal Bill of Lading Act, 49 U.S.C. § 80107 (1994).
464 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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statehood or sovereignty under international law.465 The interest of
the "people," therefore, is an integral part of any sovereign voice,
yet in reality the voice of the host government is not always syn-
onymous with the voice of the "people." The notion that govern-
ments act in the best interest of citizenry is at best a rebuttable pre-
sumption-in "Third World" business deals, whether governments
effectively act for the "people" may present a gap between law and
reality.
4.2.5. Incorporation of Two Practical Procedural Safeguards into
the Current Pattern of Dispute Resolution Methods in
International Deal-Making
International business disputes are often resolved via either in-
stitutional or ad hoc arbitration.466 Where an arbitration award is
non-binding or is otherwise challenged as invalid, or where arbi-
tration has not been effectively agreed to, or cannot otherwise be
enforced under the applicable law, there exists an opportunity for
the foreign investor to bring a lawsuit against the host government
or its SOE, or vice versa. (Suits will also have to be brought to en-
force an arbitral award.)467 Where to file suit may practically de-
pend on those assets of the defendant available for attachment or
subject to judgment execution, together with other jurisdictional
and forum non conveniens principles under the law of the forum
465 See, e.g., FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 359, at §201; NEIL C.
BLOND ET AL, BLOND'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 80-83 (Marafino ed., 1991).
466 See, e.g., Mark Baker & Arif H. Ali, Risk Management in International Com-
mercial Transactions: Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolutions, 15 INT'L Q. 252-
288 (2003); Ian Brownlie, The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes in Practice,
7 PACE INT'L L. REV. 257 (1995); William K. Slate II, International Arbitration: Do In-
stitutions Make a Difference?, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 41 (1996); see also Michael D.
Goldhaber, Arbitration Survey: Major European Arbitrations, THE NAT'L L. J., Sept.
15, 2003, at 16 (surveying ten disputes going to arbitration: from oil pipelines to
satellites, of $700 million or higher at stake).
467 U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards [hereinafter New York Convention], June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330
U.N.T.S. 38. The Convention is implemented in the United States via the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (2000); see also Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiel-
lano Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310 (2nd Cir. 1998) (discussing an action for enforcement
of foreign arbitration award against defendant under the New York Convention);
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 1995) (analyzing the district
court's authority to issue stay of confirmation of international arbitration award);
RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN A NUSHELL 66-
70 (6th ed. 2000) (discussing enforcement of arbitral awards under New York
Convention).
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where suit is filed (lexfori).468
In dispute resolution, the interpretation of international eco-
nomic law by judicial and arbitral tribunals must include these
"third party beneficiary," "public trust," "government as people's
agent," and "corporate derivative fiduciary duty" concepts. These
concepts must be applied to the adjudication or resolution of inter-
national disputes, as courts, arbitrators, and legal drafting work-
groups seek to doctrinally "internationalize" cross-border business
contracts in order to supplement and harmonize national laws, to-
ward the formation of a rule-of-law system that hopefully meets
the consensus, conscience, and confidence of our modern civilized
world.
469
While the aforementioned legal concepts are sound and can
even be viewed as jurisprudentially conventional, real-life issues
do emerge in their application to certain FDI contracts. One such
perplexing legal and practical issue is the challenge of identifying
new causes of action for the "people," or according legal standing
468 For an assortment of secondary sources and commentaries discussing U.S.
case law applying concepts of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens to
the litigation of international disputes, see L.W. NEWMAN & D. ZASLOWSKY,
LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 29, 85 (West 1996); Friedrich K.
Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1027 (1995); Earl M.
Maltz, Unraveling The Conundrum of the Law of Personal Jurisdiction: A Comment on
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 1987 DUKE L.J. 669
(1987); Peter Prince, Bhopal, Bougainville and OK Tedi: Why Australia's Forum Non
Conveniens Approach is Better, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 573 (1998); see also Republic
of Bolivia v. Philip Morris Co., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (S.D. Texas 1999) (transferring
suit filed by foreign government against U.S.-based MNC to District of Columbia);
FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 359, § 421.
469 The doctrinal tension between a universal model of positivism and a rela-
tive multicultural concept allowing for variations of standards has been an ongo-
ing debate in modern international jurisprudence. The post-World War II efforts
at a universal human rights framework, via U.N. documents such as the various
post-World War II human rights conventions, illustrate that a relative degree of
success in attempting universal norms can be achieved over time. See Human
Rights Resources in the United Nations System, at http://www.un.org/ part-
ners/civil-society/m-hr.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2005). However, the problem
and challenge continue to be the teeth, and the enforcement realism, of the current
universal human rights framework. Universal human rights law, therefore, con-
tinues to be regarded as "soft" or aspirational law, rather than "hard" law having
the effect of the "mandatory rules." But a set of aspirational universal standards
that can serve as a checklist of goals is still better than no standards at all. Law
has both a prescriptive as well as an expressive function. In its expressive function,
law allows a society of free men and women to declare behavioral standards and
articulate "our aspirations for the kind of society we wish to be." Stephen L. Elkin, Lib-
ertarian Confusions, THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Fall 2002, at 49, 52 (emphasis
added) (discussing RICHARD EPSTEIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF A FREE SOCIETY (2002)).
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and parties-in-interest status to potential litigants for access to the
adversarial and decision-making processes, both nationally and in-
ternationally. Specifically, in contract negotiation, as well as in ar-
bitral proceedings or lawsuits, who can speak the voice of the
"peoples/third-party beneficiaries," apart from their governments?
(Currently, the voice of the people at times can be heard ad hoc
and in isolated incidents, primarily via public opinion often ex-
pressed outside the developing nation, or in the work of interna-
tional public interest or shareholder activist groups. The voices
expressed by these groups can also be politicized or fragmented in
their own esoteric way. Public opinion often varies and can be
highly politicized by tension and competition among various in-
terest groups, especially in our pluralistic global community.)
Instead of attempting to substantively resolve these perplexing
and potentially highly politicized issues, I will simply advocate
two practical procedural solutions: 470
(1) Because the voice of the "third-party beneficiaries" can rela-
tively be represented by NGOs/INGOs, 471 and other shareholder
activist groups, these public interest organizations should be given
limited access to the negotiation of FDI projects receiving Multilat-
eral Financing, even though these groups are not parties to the in-
vestment contracts. 472
470 My choice to use procedural solutions to incorporate substantive law has
support from at least one commentator. See Cohen, supra note 448, at 265-66:
Government officials are, in an economic and legal sense, agents. The
principals of government agents are the people. .. [T]he insufficient in-
centive of government agents to protect collective rights in property...
suggests the merit of a procedural remedy that allows or even encourages
private persons to assert collective rights. I emphasize that this problem,
to the extent that there is one, calls for a procedural, rather than a substan-
tive remedy.
Id. (emphasis added).
471 More than 10,000 Non-Governmental Organizations ("NGOs") have de-
veloped around the globe as grassroots, public interest responses to global "civic"
concerns. Organizations such as Amnesty International (human rights), Oxfam
(poverty, hunger), and Greenpeace (ecology) have become highly visible and
powerful. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY AND ITS CRITICS 123, 144 (2000);
McAdams, supra note 361, at 247. The growth of NGOs suggests the vitality of an
information market for the commercial future of the world. Id.
472 For an account of the history of recent partnership between NGOs and
MNCs in the corporate ethics crusade, see Ethan B. Kapstein, The Corporate Ethics
Crusade, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 105 (2004) (describing NGOs and other organizations
pursuing heightened corporate ethics); see also Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict of
Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to Substance, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 931, 947 (2002) ("In-
ternational, regional, and non-governmental organizations -rather than treaty
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As a matter of mandatory procedure, these groups must be in-
vited to participate in the negotiation, at a minimum, in the form of
written inputs presented to governments, the MNCs, and the vari-
ous work groups within the Multilateral Institutions, with manda-
tory responses from these parties as a condition for funding. The
negotiating parties to a deal will thus be placed directly under the
pressure of formally responding to public scrutiny and will have to
address public interest arguments during the formation of invest-
ment contracts. The selection of the participating public interest
groups can depend on the recommendations of the Multilaterals
and other international organizations, including the United Na-
tions and its various organs. Priority should be given to locally
formed NGOs.473 This procedure does not compromise confidenti-
ality objectives, because in most cases, high-profiled multi-million-
dollar FDI projects receiving Multilateral Funding are physically
visible, and already attract publicity and news coverage. This lim-
ited "participating" procedure will also force the Multilateral Insti-
tutions to voluntarily implement more transparency in their inter-
nal workings and application of funding criteria.
(2) Decision-makers in dispute resolution -whether judges or
arbitrators- should be mandated to consider voices of these same
public interest groups by way of amicus curiae briefs and expert
testimonies, or equivalent. In this regard, confidentiality require-
ments traditionally accorded institutional or ad hoc arbitration pro-
ceedings should be waived, but only to a limited extent. The reso-
lution of international contractual disputes has traditionally been
purely economic in substantive nature, and has remained private
and confidential from a procedural perspective. Final resolutions
have been popularized only by the mutual consent of the parties
involved.474 The determination as to which INGOs/NGOs, or any
negotiations between sovereigns -have.., played an increasingly important role
in the development of law applicable to transnational activity"); Morton Winston,
NGO Strategies for Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility, 16 ETHICS AND INT'L
AFF. 71 (2002);.
473 Unfortunately, only approximately 15% of NGOs are from the developing
countries. Ronald J. Glossup, Global Governance Requires Global Government, in
TOWARD GENUINE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: CRITICAL REACTIONS TO 'OUR GLOBAL
NEIGHBORS' 43, 48 (Errol E. Harris & James A. Yunker eds., 1999); McAdams, supra
note 361, at 241.
474 See, e.g., U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbi-
tration Rules Art. 32(5); American Arbitration Association (AAA) International
Rules arts. 21(4), 27(5) & 28(5), app. I art. 6, app. II art 1.; Hong Kong International
Arbitration Centre Mediation Rule 12(i); International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) Rules Art. 23(2); London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) Rules
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or any other public interest groups may be allowed access to an
otherwise confidential and private proceeding, and to what extent,
can rest in the capable hands and sound discretion of judicial and
arbitral tribunals, who already are called upon and charged with
the expertise to make many decisions and to exercise discretion
routinely in dispute resolution.
At a philosophical level, incorporating a "public interest" ap-
proach to MNCs' international business deal-making as a way of
monitoring MNCs' behaviors is not a novel concept. Similar pro-
posals have been made to change the existing legal framework of
corporate governance, although the effectiveness of these propos-
als in real-world dynamics remains questionable. For example,
proposals to install "public interest directors" in Board composi-
tion have been challenged as merely serving a "window-dressing"
function. In reality, these directors were regarded as antagonistic
spies, were met with suspicion and treated with lack of coopera-
tion and, hence, were often denied resources or information access.
Eventually, these public interest directors became co-opted into the
mainstream corporate culture, were transformed, and ultimately
turned counterproductive to their original public interest mission.
Likewise, proposals for corporate "social accounting" and "social
audits" have also been criticized as "window-dressing," unneces-
sarily increasing corporate expenditures without effectively fur-
thering social goals.475
Accordingly, in whatever form the "management-based" self-
regulation model may take, it should avoid the shortcomings of
previous proposals. Its measurability, therefore, must be based on
a "disclosure" or "monitoring" template that accomplishes all of
the three following objectives: (i) allow management to become
truly self motivated in the competition for improved public image
Articles 10(4) & 30; accord Charles S. Baldwin, Protecting Confidential and Proprie-
tary Commercial Information in International Arbitration, 31 TEx. INT'L L. J. 451 (1996);
Hans Smit, Confidentiality, Art. 73-76, 9 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 233 (1998); Kenji
Tashiro, Quest for a Rational and Proper Method for the Publication of Arbitral Awards,
9 J. INT'L ARB. 97 (1992); ICC International Court of Arbitration, Rules of Arbitration, at
www.Iccwbo.org/court/English/arbitration/ rules.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2005);
Permanent Court of Arbitration, at http://Pca-cpa.org (last visited Feb. 22, 2005);
American Arbitration Association: Dispute Resolution Services Worldwide, at
www.adr.Org/rules/international-arb_rules.htn-l (last visited Feb. 26, 2005); see
also AAA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes (1977), reprinted
in CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY 5 (Rena A. Garlin ed., 1986); International
Bar Association (IBA), International Code of Ethics, § 9 (1988).
475 See, e.g., Branson, supra note 437, at 1207, 1213-14 (discussing new trends
in corporate governance in the future).
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and goodwill in the marketplace; (ii) allow socially conscientious
institutional investors and third-party institutions direct access to
corporate governance; and (iii) allow regulators to effectively foster
both management incentives and public-interest third-party input.
4.3. Rethinking Globalization, Legal Regionalism, International
Harmonization, and Standardization of Law
A global market is one in which geography, political, or cul-
tural norms do not restrain demand and supply. In a global mar-
ket, economic functions are based on transnational interdepend-
ence. As such, the very notion of globalization threatens and
undermines the sanctity of sovereign power. Globalization thus
occasions the need for an integrated regulatory network in which
sovereign mandates must be reconciled and compromised to avoid
conflicts. Private enterprises will support such a network because
it reduces the cost of compliance as well as the cost of dispute reso-
lution under various national regimes. Because globalization en-
ables the convergence of national substantive rules and legal
norms, it serves the mutual interests of all economic and govern-
mental actors.
International institutions have been, and will continue to be
created to serve this goal. The WTO and NAFTA are examples of
institutional frameworks created in the past decade, but these
frameworks represent the perspective of governments. At the
same time, the grouping of nation-states to develop legal norms
(for example, a "regionalism" approach to the development of in-
ternational economic law typified by the European Union model)
has also forced nation-states to table their mutual interests and de-
velop common grounds for "legalization." Efforts to harmonize
national legal rules by the U.N. Commission on International
Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), the International Institute for the Uni-
fication of Private Law ("UNIDROIT"), the International Chamber
of Commerce ("ICC"), and other international legal work groups
also demonstrate this "legalization" trend. Yet, these institutional
voices and efforts have not always truly reflected the interests of all
market participants, especially those "Third World" inhabitants
whose lives are directly at stake.
The harmonization of national laws does little to serve the
global market if harmonization starts from systems of national
laws that serve the unitary voices of corporate giants supported by
renewed "monarchies" as their business partners. In order for le-
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gal harmonization and economic globalization to be meaningful,
the voices of "Third World" constituents- the third-party benefici-
aries of certain government-private sector contractual arrange-
ments in their countries - should drive the goals of global eco-
nomic development, just as much as other institutional voices have
driven the process. But who is to speak as the voice of such con-
stituents? The regional and international law-drafting processes
pioneered by work groups from the developed nations must be re-
examined and expanded to include the voices of other actors. Spe-
cifically, these processes must include input of international and
local public interest groups representing the voices of "Third
World" inhabitants, as diversely and as widespread as possible.
In examining the action and policy of the Bush Administration,
liberal scholars have cautioned that unilateralism will intensify
gaps and conflicts among political, economic, and religious cul-
tures, thereby confirming their notion that the United States, or the
"West" it symbolizes, is imperialistic. 476 Only true multilateralism
worked from the "bottom up" in terms of the development ladder,
rather than the "top down,"47 7 can adequately address these issues.
So far, the Multilateral Agencies, MNCs and governments have be-
come partners in "Third World" economic development in ways
that may not always benefit the native inhabitants. Although the
Multilaterals, in their fifty years of history, have been subject to
much scholarly and community criticism with respect to their eco-
476 See, e.g., Michael J. Kelly, The Bush Foreign Policy 2001-2003: Unilateralist
Theory in a Multilateral World, and the Opportunity for Change Offered by Iraq, 2
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 221, 225-26 (2003) (contrasting unilateralism
against multilateralism; quoting President George W. Bush: "Every nation, in
every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with
the terrorists." (citing President's Message to Joint Session of Congress Respond-
ing to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140, 1142 (Sept.
20, 2001))); see also RANETA LAWSON MACK & MICHAEL J. KELLY, EQUAL JUSTICE IN
THE BALANCE: AMERICA'S LEGAL RESPONSES TO THE EMERGING TERRORIST THREAT
(2004); Harold Hongju Koh, Rights to Remember, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 2003, at
24-25 (discussing how September 11th changed America's approach to human
rights; written by the current Dean of Yale Law School).
477 Scholars have referred to the trend of unfettered, capital-driven force as
"globalization from above," distinguishable from "globalization from below,"
which encompasses the notion of the welfare state. See DORVAL BRUNELLE,
ALTERNATIVE TO GLOBALIZATION: A BETTER WORLD IS POSSIBLE (2004) (suggesting
"World Economy and Fair Trade" as an alternative to "Globalization and Free
Trade" and advocating engagement at both local and global levels); McAdams,
supra note 361, at 268 ("[G]lobalization-from-below ... would work to humanize
and democratize the process of globalization and give attention to citizen interests
not meaningfully represented by the current globalization-from-above [pat-
terns].").
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nomic policies, 478 they have also been praised for the de facto ex-
pansion of their original goals -a phenomenon described by com-
mentators as the "mission creep." This "mission creep" embraces
other public concerns into the bundle of "economic considerations"
traditionally characterizing the Multilaterals' missions.479 This is
the current status of "economic multilateralism" and "Third
World" economic cooperation at the beginning of the new millen-
nium.480
Globalization will only bear its fruits if it gives birth to a truly
stronger, healthier, and all-encompassing "middle class" that tran-
scends national and cultural borders. The emergence of such a
borderless middle class will quickly alleviate the clash between the
culturally or economically dominant and the culturally or eco-
nomically oppressed, because the overall economic model strives
to include all. To achieve this vision, all voices and interests
should be reflected in the pattern of global economic development.
But even if the voices of INGOs, NGOs, and public interest
groups are included and legitimized as part of negotiation and
dispute resolution, this liberalization or expansion of processes
does not necessarily assure that the interest of "Third World peo-
ple" is adequately protected. The protection of these "third-party
beneficiaries" can only ultimately be achieved in the formation and
development of international economic law itself.481 Whether in-
fluenced by a common-law or civil-law system, the harmonization
of law, as well as the accompanying legal drafting and develop-
ment processes should not be left to isolated national courts or con-
fidentially shielded arbitrators who determine outcomes of dis-
478 See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLrrz, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 23-36
(2002). But see Brink Lindsey, Bookshelf. Playing the Blame Game in a World of Trou-
ble, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2002, at D2 (reviewing Stiglitz's book as a flat analysis of
market fundamentalism in a globalized world).
479 The "mission creep" has prompted commentators to question whether
roles of the Multilaterals should be expanded to include the implementation and
enforcement of international humanitarian law. See, e.g., Daniel D. Bradlow,
Should the International Financial Institutions Play a Role in the Implementation and
Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 695, 707-09 (2002)
(arguing a distinction between implementing and enforcing international humani-
tarian law, where implementation is a more cost-efficient method).
480 McAdams, supra note 361, at 245, 252 (observing that critics view the
WTO, World Bank, and IMF as a tool of rich industrial interests, and that these
institutions restrict government programs in the developing nations toward fur-
ther promotion of free-market strategies imposed upon loan recipients).
481 Id. at 240, 242 (stating that globalization elevates the importance of law in
the world trade community).
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putes on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. Harmonization should be-
come part of an agenda that join together all economic, political,
and public interests. Watchdog functions must be accomplished
through 1) the dynamics of special interest lobbying and promul-
gation of multinational regulations by the MNC's home country
under its prescriptive jurisdiction; 2) the law-making processes of
the host country, whereupon the public interest voices are con-
sulted and allowed to be involved in the drafting stages; and 3) last
but not least, long-term meaningful political changes in the devel-
oping economies. Only responsible and competent governments
can bring about true economic prosperity for the "Third World"
public, but this can only be achieved if equal opportunities in educa-
tion become available to "Third World" inhabitants as a necessary
infrastructure for the future. Otherwise, regime changes in re-
sponse to political chaos will simply be the outcome predicted in
George Orwell's classic Animal Farm482 - there is a change of
guards, but the new guards are just a different manifestation of the
old ones. This has been the hard fact of our world. The lesson of
Vietnam (as in the Vietnam Deal) should serve as a d~ja vu path to
be watched out for, with respect to central Asia and oil-rich Iraq
currently awaiting stabilization and development.
4.4. The Role of MNCs and the Need for a Formalized "Public Interest"
Approach Toward International Deal-Making
The world community continues to face serious issues such as
the eruption of violence, military aggression, and acts of war, all
legitimized by slogans of national security, religion, and territorial
principles. Addressing these issues in isolation in accordance with
the political agenda of countries' leadership is to ignore the true
undercurrent dynamics and the synchronized, cause-and-effect na-
ture of these issues. Root causes, direct or indirect, contributing or
primary, must be examined. Perhaps one such root cause is the in-
creasing gap between the rich and the poor, regardless of national
borders. Perhaps another such root cause is the disguised return of
colonialism and monarchies, whether intended or coincidental. It
is hoped that this Article has helped identify a small part of the
landscape upon which some of these root causes may have arisen,
ultimately raising these issues to a different level of awareness.
Despite the rapid privatization process since the collapse of
Marxism as an economic model in Europe, the nation-state none-
482 GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (1945).
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theless remains the major economic force in developing countries,
and is likely to retain its role in the foreseeable future. The con-
tinuing state involvement in business transactions with MNCs oc-
casions a number of contractual techniques that have become legal
norms by repetitive and prevalent usage and impact. The fact that
the MNC-host government contract remains the main tool for pat-
terning global economic development is not a vice in itself. After
all, freedom of contract and the exercise of bargaining power are
the gist of free enterprise. What may be problematic is the way in
which the contract is formed and implemented. The goal, there-
fore, is not necessarily to eliminate these partnerships, as they are
essential to nation building and the development of a world econ-
omy. Instead, there is a need for a formalized mechanism to enable
public scrutiny of these partnerships. These partnerships must be
examined, perhaps with more transparency, notwithstanding their
confidential nature, via the direct participation of independent
public interest actors, such that changes can take place in the way
these partnerships are formed and shaped.' Such a formalized
"public interest" approach to the formation and interpretation of
foreign investment contracts in certain industries comports with
the spirit of what scholars have considered as the compassionate
"Third Way" movement to global economics. The "Third Way"
movement advocates "social democracy" based on social commit-
ments to the poor and the disadvantaged without undermining the
free market.483
MNCs do not 'categorically qualify as "bad guys" just because
they are rich. Modern society's extraordinary economic and tech-
nological progress brought about by major corporations is undis-
483 The "Third Way" movement was allegedly supported by President Clin-
ton, Prime Minister Tony Blair, and a number of research scholars. McAdams,
supra note 361, at 267; see ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY AND ITs CRrrIcs 123-
24 (2000) (quoting Tony Blair supporting the Third Way movement); Richard Falk,
The Pursuit of International Justice: Present Dilemmas and an Imagined Future, 52 J.
INT'L AFF. 409, 432 (1999); cf. Branson, Corporate Social Responsibility Redux, supra
note 437, at 1222-26 (discussing the "Green Movement" with respect to environ-
mental issues as a principle component for new corporate social responsibility);
John M. Church, A Market Solution to Green Marketing: Some Lessons from the Eco-
nomics of Information, 79 MINN. L. REV. 245, 251-52 (1994) (noting that seventy-six
percent of Americans consider themselves environmentalists); Joseph F. DiMento
& Francesco Bertolinin, Green Management and the Regulatory Process: For Mother
Earth, Market Share and Modern Rule, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 121, 123 (1996) (examin-
ing relations with regulatory bodies and their "implications for the regulatory
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puted. What IOGCs are doing in the worldwide petroleum and
energy sector simply reflects what humans have been doing since
the beginning of history-the uncovering of natural resources to
serve the needs of human survival and technological betterment.
Today, if armed with a better breed of corporate counsel and ex-
ecutives, together with a differently focused, self-imposed corpo-
rate code of social responsibility, MNCs are among the group of ac-
tors best situated to address global issues-from the eradication of
poverty, inequality, race, gender and religious discrimination,
child labor, environmental pollution, overall workforce abuse and
exploitation, to the wise and effective use of state-of-the-art tech-
nology to serve humankind. This "social responsibility" mission is
only possible via the individual awareness and changing attitude
of the MNC international executive and his/her lawyer, working
as a pair as they continue their globe-trotting. The focus on MNCs
should not be the rhetoric of holding money or power as the source
of evil, since free enterprise should be allowed to work. Rather,
scrutinizing MNCs' conduct should constitute a wake-up call re-
garding the need for a formalized, systematic public interest check-
and-balance approach toward the internationalization of law.
Overall, considering all angles of public debates, the stern critic
and thoughtful policymaker should question whether the ultimate
objective of the multilateral process-the eradication of "Third
World" poverty, as administered by institutions such as the World
Bank, the IMF, and the WTO-has adequately been discharged,
and how government-MNC partnerships have helped or have hurt
"the dream of a world free from poverty." 84 As the first step, new
legal mechanisms must be made available for exclusive and confi-
dential MNC-host government partnerships to formally include
the voices of "Third World" inhabitants via independent public in-
terest advocacy.
In summary, my thesis for reform can be cast as five main
propositions. First, the role of, and the rules of ethics governing,
the transactional lawyer in international deals should be reevalu-
ated. Second, the role of international or global organizations,
whose financial participation in these projects should also be re-
considered. Third, those laws of the United States that may govern
the extra-territorial activities of U.S.-based MNCs should be util-
ized or expanded to harness those MNCs' behaviors. Fourth, pre-
scriptive mechanisms should also come from mandated changes in
484 See The World Bank Mission Statement, supra note 398.
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corporate cultures, best accomplished via (i) a governmental re-
quirement for self-imposed corporate compliance systems, (ii) the
public interest dimensions of such compliance programs, and (iii)
government-mandated public disclosures of these compliance pro-
grams' implementation. Fifth, the internal political and legal re-
gimes of certain host countries should be changed to afford inhabi-
tants the check-and-balance process of a rule-of-law system and
liberal democracy. This last proposition is the hardest and perhaps
the most idealistic goal of all.
This "twin series" of Articles explores and opens the debate as
to how each of these five "pressure points should be deployed"
(borrowing the words of an esteemed colleagues at the University
of Denver Sturm College of Law).485 Within the vein of these five
propositions, no detailed solution will emerge overnight, but as a
starting point and for many years to come, this "twin series" of Ar-
ticles hopes, at a minimum, to invite a dialogue on how these new
legal mechanisms must be structured and implemented.
485 Interview with Edward Dauer, Professor of Law, University of Denver
Sturm College of Law (on file with author).
150 [Vol. 26:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol26/iss1/2
